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ABSTRACT
The Symptom:

A Positive Perspective

(September 1981)

Jeffrey L. Lukens

,

B.A., Tufts College

M.A., University of Iowa, M.S., University
of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Howard Gadlin

The theory and practice of all psychotherapy
is

influenced in the most basic ways by the meta- theoretical

underpinnings implicit in attitudes toward psychological
deviance and its manifestation in symptomology

.

This dis-

sertation is built around a comparison of positive and

negative meta- theoretical perspectives in psychotherapy.
The positive and negative perspectives do not establish

another psychological theory.

Rather, they form those

crucial meta-theoretical poles which determine the adequacy
of our theory to capture the essential human condition and
the potency of our practice to facilitate psychotherapeutic

change.

The meta-theoretical notions that keep us at a

distance, that induce blockages in our ability to empathize
and get closer to the inner world of another, together with
the consequences for the psychotherapeutic process, consti-

tute the negative perspective.

V

Professional psychotherapists and
society in general
reduce psychological symptomology to
an excessively negative
and simplistic phenomenon.
Language and theoretical
con-

structs are permeated with these unexamined
assumptions
which would diminish symptomatic man to
lifeless', mechanical
object if ication.
TTieoretical dehumanization of the
deviant
population evokes an attitude of distance and
dominance.

Consequently we fail to hear the language of the
symptom,
its artful reaching out in camouflaged
symbology to

estab-

lish that dialogue needed for psychological change.
There is another way of looking at psychological

symptomology which facilitates empathy and psychotherapy:
the positive perspective.

This meta-theoretical perspective

is more than a tidy collection of ideas and techniques which

can be easily memorized and assimilated.

The positive

perspective is always an achievement and requires continual
struggle.
long.

No one fully attains it or maintains it for very

Its temporary achievement is always resisted by

internal and external censors.

These censorious forces

arise out of the peculiar nature of consciousness itself,
out of our need to distance from discomforting exposure to

madness, out of the needs of an embryonic psychology to

establish scientific legitimacy, and from societal pressures
to keep the mirror of madness from reflecting our failures.

vi

The positive and negative perspectives
are elusive.
To heighten awareness of them the
philosophical premises are
delimited and the broad meaning of symptomology
is developed.
Increasingly, this theme is concretized
first by
situating it within general psychotherapeutic
constructs in
a psychoanalytic base,

then by tracing its history within

mainstream psychoanalytic thought, and finally by
exemplifying its reality and importance in psychotherapy,

and consulting.

supervision

The psychoanalytic tradition has been

chosen because of its seminal influence and current hegemony
in the theory and practice of working with the psychologi-

cally deviant population.

Within this tradition, the

positive perspective has had a long and erratic course

beginning with the truly radical and courageous breakthroughs of Freud.

Beginning in 1893 and ending with a loss of nerve in
1920,

Freud almost single-handedly articulated the essential

theoretical and practical qualities of the positive perspective.

However, these qualities were never cohesively

presented and are found scattered in isolated segments of
his writings.

Many of the major theorists/psychotherapists

who followed extended one or more aspects of the positive

perspective on symptomology, although the lineage is clearest in the object relational,

self psychology pioneers.

Those who worked with children and psychotics especially

VIL

learned the most about the positive
perspective orientation,
The attempt to understand the insistent
but often incomprehensible ways of children and psychotics has
also provided
the experiential ground out of which this
work has
grown.

Their message can facilitate psychotherapy,
supervision and
consultation with all symptomatic populations.
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INTRODUCTION
The way all of us look at psychological
deviance and
at its hopeful remedy in psychotherapeutic
change is pro-

foundly limited.

We are caught up in a perspective which
is

inadequate, which overly simplifies, and which dulls
our

ability to understand madness and its communicative
expression in symptomology.
This dominant perspective insidiously
colors our perceptions, our theory, and our mode of relating
to those considered symptomatic.

My intent is to unveil and

delimit this covert perspective and to bring into focus
another way of seeing.
There is a secretive, forbidden quality enshrouding
this unpopular other way of seeing.

I

have always felt it

necessary to keep this perspective to myself and even from
myself.

It is an uncomfortable way of seeing which demands

a continually renewed willingness to live with discomfort.

My method in what follows is to alternate from one perspective to the other, teasing out the theoretical parameters
and practical consequences of each, while speculating on the

sources of the discomfort.

As

I

go along, my aim is to

increase awareness of another orientation to the symptom in

order to promote that healing dialogue needed by client and

therapist as well.

1
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This other way of seeing and
the consequences for our
notions of change and psychotherapeutic
technique comprise
the positive perspective.
The positive perspective
always
starts with the symptom.
By symptom I mean something
broader in scope than simply those
patterns of psychologically deviant thought and behavior
classified in DSM-III
(Spitzer, 1980).
I mean all forms of clinically
significant
thought and behavior which may potentially
alert trained
therapists or the lay public that something
is wrong.
This

may appear as transference, regression,
hallucination, or an
anti-social act. Experientially for the therapist,
the

positive perspective is always anchored in the
therapist's

relationship to the manifestation of deviance, to the
symptom.

As will be developed later, a symptom is a complex

phenomenon.

It is more than simply the apparent sign of

pathology or deviance, although this is part of

it.

"It

is

also an effort to communicate, an effort to induce a certain

way of understanding and behaving in the environment, part
of which may be a psychotherapist.

To intellectually

understand this is important, but to be able to sustain this
sort of understanding and demonstrate it in the experience

of being with another is extremely difficult and is of the

essence of what is meant by psychotherapeutic

.

Further, as

psychotherapists we must continually return to immersion in

.

the dialogue with symptomatic
communication as a check on
the correctness of our understanding
and way of relating.
So the positive perspective
must always start and end

with the symptom.

The symptom affords a way in,
a way to

facilitate our understanding of the
other.
seeing in itself has consequences for

This way of

our understanding of

the therapeutic process.

Although on the one hand

I

am

positing much more value in the symptom
than it is generally
accorded, the focus of this paper is not on
the nature of
symptoms per se.
I am most interested in reopening
the
dialogue between patients and therapists.

It is the block-

ages in this dialogue, most of them out of our
awareness and

derived from implicit assumptions and unconscious
attitudes
toward the other, which impede the psychotherapeutic
process.

Clients want to change and seek those necessary

environmental provisions which will allow them to do so.
The scope of this paper, while expanding the notion of
symptoms, will be limited to looking at those consequences
of our implicit meta- theories which have practical bearing
on achievement of the positive perspective, on that dialogue

needed for change to occur
The positive perspective is a broad and inclusive

notion which, while being extremely abstract, is also
extremely real.

Its reality can be experienced and its

consequences are of the utmost importance for the process of

.
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psychotherapy.

But the positive perspective
does not exist
as an independent entity the
way a shoe does, for example.
I claim no transcendent,
ontological status for it.
It can
never be known in itself but only
in contrast to the other
way of seeing, to the negative
perspective.
It can only be
known in our daily struggle with relating
to ourselves and
to others.
The negative and positive
perspectives do not

constitute another psychological theory,
such as Behaviorism.
Rather, they form the meta- theoretical
poles of
the

implicit assumptions governing our attitudes
to ourselves
and others
The positive and negative perspectives form
the

defining poles along the dimension of obj ectif
ication.

To

the extent we don't separate ourselves from all
that is
human, vital, and subjectively meaningful we are in
the

realm of the positive perspective.

To the extent that we

treat ourselves or the other as inanimate, as off the

continuum with our inner self, as an object with little

meaningfulness in itself, we are closer to the negative
perspective.

We all tend to vascillate between these two

poles and no one achieves the positive perspective for very
long.

We might treat our dearest loved ones, for example,

with the respect and empathy characteristic of the positive
perspective.

We might also, out of our fear of madness or

out of the expediency a job might provoke, treat mental

5

patients as objects, as examples of
pathology wholly different from ourselves, as requiring no
more thought than it
takes to medicate or to warehouse.
No one theory, or school of thought,
or group of

people has a monopoly on either of these
perspectives.
However, the relatively asymptomatic
population always tends
to objectify those labeled as mentally
deviant or symptomatic.

At least in the world of psychotherapy,
especially in
its theory, the negative perspective always
tends to be

dominant and in the majority and its consensual power
makes
the individual expression of the positive perspective
seem

radical.

This is what

I

mean by the secret nature of this

other way of seeing, of the positive perspective.

My growth

as a therapist has demanded that I find the courage to

achieve greater clarity about the reality and character of
this perspective which needs to express itself in subtle and

camouflaged forms in symptomatic communication.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in any

depth the origins of the censorious forces which make the

positive perspective such a difficult achievement.

At first

glimpse, it appears that society has developed a consensual

contract which operates out of our awareness but into which
we all readily buy.

It is as though we have collectively

conspired to legitimize turning into inconsequential objects
those people who threaten our sense of stability, our sense

6

of power and effectance, who would
dare confront us with the
thinness and vulnerability of our
comfortable sanity, or who
would remind us of the failures and cost
of our society.
Or

perhaps, as does Sartre in Being and
Nothingness (1956), we
must look within ourselves to the very
nature of consciousness for this negation of the other and of
ourselves which
is the essence of obj ectif ication.

Sartre (1956) claims that negation arises
logically
and experientially in the same moment as our
awareness of

beingness.

Awareness of our beingness-in-itself immediately

confronts us with the dreadful awareness of non-being.

To

enjoy the fruits of that delicious sense of being fully

alive is to live in the shadow of non-being, of death, of
obj ectif ication.

It takes great courage to sustain the

intensity of awareness of beingness and of the concomitant
sense of non-being.

Consequently we project that negation

onto others, or we deaden ourselves and the world around us

by detaching from this awareness.

Further, to be aware of

our beingness is to apprehend that this possibility that is

myself is only one of many possibilities.

Being confronted

with the recognition of my inherent freedom in choosing one
of all these possibilities, and my awareness that
life on the possibility
anxiety.

I

choose,

I

bet my

is cause for great

Thus we tend to distract ourselves from this

awareness, we negate ourselves, we lie to ourselves, we
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indulge in "bad faith."

This attitude of negation and

denial mitigates the beingness of
others for ourself and of
ourself for others as we have negated
ourselves.
Therefore
others are negated as well.
Sartre would assert that given
our tendency to hide in bad faith we
all tend to objectify
not just mental patients but everyone,
including ourselves.

Whatever the source or sources of this obj
ectif ication
of our clients and their symptoms, this
phenomenon is

prevalent and impedes our ability to facilitate
psychotherapeutic change.

I

cannot imagine a world without the

continual dialectical play of obj ectif ication mixed with

moments of compassion, empathy, and understanding.

My

position in this respect is more aligned with Foucault
(1961/1973) than with Laing (1960, 1961, 1967) in that

I

am

not advocating the overthrow of the consensual way of seeing
and

I

don't view myself and mental deviance as being inde-

pendent of, and superior to our social context.
I

To Foucault

would add that none of us is independent of our mental

context, of the nature of consciousness.

The purpose of

this paper, of explicating ramifications of the positive

perspective, is to try to temporarily achieve a glimpse of

both sides of that tension that exists between our often

misguided efforts to understand our clients and our clients'
efforts to communicate their reality to us.

This tension is

further situated within the client's artful production of a

8

symptom.

In the course of this
journey,

I

hope to sketch

out some of the basic parameters
of the positive and negative perspectives as they have
existed in the psychoanalytic
literature since the time of Freud
and point out their
consequences for therapy.
Before I do that, it might prove
helpful if I offer a concrete sense
of my theme by relating
two formative incidents which
helped make me aware that
there was the possibility of another
way of seeing.
One of the first notable incidents
took place while

I

was working for Dr. John Rosen as a
live-in head of a house
of psychotic patients at Twin Silos, a
retreat geared to the

therapy of refractory psychotics.
used, not even aspirin.

One day

No drugs of any sort were
I

was sitting by myself,

reading, when David (name changed), a chronically
psychotic

paranoid schizophrenic of forty-two, walked by.

My rela-

tionship (if you can call it that) with David had always
been extremely strained as he was totally uncooperative in
any of the duties we all were to share in the upkeep of
the
house.

David acted like a prima donna, was capable of great

anger when pushed to do something, and our interactions were

nothing but power struggles.

I

always felt that this is how

it had to be as David was generally regarded as having

reached his optimum level of functioning because of his past
history with "maintenance shock."

David had received ECT

every day for approximately two years.

He now could dress

and care for himself, but no
one thought him capable of
much
meaningful interaction.

David was prone to talking to
inanimate objects and on
this occasion he said something
to the lamp I was using to
read by. As he walked back and forth
I sensed him craftily
looking my way but then quickly acting
preoccupied when I
looked up.
I felt in a playful mood
and decided to play
with his symptomatic behavior.
I began to talk earnestly
to
the lamp as well.
To make a long story short, David
and I
struck up a relationship initially based on
great indirectness of communication, indirect in manner as
well
as in

content.

Eventually, David even became helpful with the

household chores.

To my astonishment,

I

discovered that

David had been communicating all along but
adapt to his way of doing it.

I

had failed to

Further, there was something

frightening for me about letting go of my accustomed ways of
doing things.

David's communication, far from being impov-

erished and meaningless, was rich in meaning, too rich for

me to handle most of the time.

He was highly attuned to the

slightest whisper of interpersonal communication:
voice, a look, a gesture.

It was

a tone of

very unsettling to be with

someone who remained in a state of hyper -awareness and who

perceived things about myself and others which would pass
without notice in the as3miptomatic world.
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A second influential incident
took place several years
later when I was engaged in a
practicum
at the outpatient

unit of a Veterans Administration
Mental Hospital.
One of
the senior staff psychiatrists who
was much respected for
his long experience, the books he
had written, and especially for his superciUious ways,
referred a patient to me.
I was told, in essence, that I
was being afforded the chance
to further my education by getting
to see a dyed-in-the-wool
specimen of paranoid thinking. At our staff
meeting I was
further told that this man's acute disorder
indicated very
severe pathology.
The only sensible course of action was
medication and clearly therapy would be a waste of
time as

his prognosis was so poor.

They decided that for the sake

of an educational experience, however, it would do
no harm
for me to see him once per week on an hourly basis.
I

began to see this man, let's call him Tom.

True to

his diagnosis, Tom related with great intensity his feeling
that his wife, his co-workers in construction, and his

friends were all acting aggressively toward him.

I

was

intrigued by this uneducated man, by his survival ability in
the face of a disasterous home situation as a child.

He had

worked his way out of poverty, abuse and neglect and was on
the verge of making it as the construction boss.

He had a

home, a wife, and two children and was evidently skilled in

his trade.

Despite his limited vocabulary, in his

11

descriptions and telling of his story
there was a kind of
simple eloquence which class bias
could easily obscure.
I
decided to listen carefully to Tom, not
just to signs of his
paranoia but to the content and context
of what he was
saying.

began to understand Tom's world a
little and
began to understand that Tom, like David,
wasn't
I

I

just

delusional and "decathected" from the real
world.

His

symptoms contained his whole story and spoke
forcefully of
his attempts to work out past traumas and detours
in his

self.

Tom also had been pushed into a state of hyper-

sensitivity and awareness of his environment as became
clear
in his perceptions of me and of the staff.
to appreciate his reality,

As

I

became able

the symbolic themes of his

symptoms led to an understanding of how his past was being
lived out in the present.

Tom had, unawares, selected

aspects of his current world, which few could see but were
real nevertheless, to concretize traumatic interpersonal
themes from the past.

Some of this had been precipitated by

his great guilt over impending success as a boss and over
the unfaithfulness of his desire for women other than his

wife.

Tom came to some reconciliation with his past and

with his great fear of loss of the internalized good, but
weak object, his mother.
job as boss.

Tom went back to work and got the

12

The common denominator of these
incidents was my
recognition that there was a person
behind and in the
symptoms.
I didn't start off with
that idea and I am not
sure what led me to listen in a
different way. Perhaps it
was the challenge provoked by those
particular settings.

Whatever the reasons,

I

was intrigued with my observations

that the mental health deliverers seemed
too distant,

separated, and preoccupied with their theory
and were deaf
and blind to the communication of their
clients.
The

therapists, institutional staff, and the lay
public seemed
to cling tenaciously to an implicit assumption
that madness

was qualitatively different from normality.

There was an

attitude of superiority toward those who were more symptomatic.

This very attitude precluded communication and impeded

any possibility of establishing a therapeutic environment.
It seemed to me that our clients were always motivated for

change but that our distant, unresponsive attitude consistently undermined their attempts to establish that environ-

ment they required.

This is the crux of the problem.

The

theoretical and practical aspects of the positive perspective are intended to mitigate the unseen but forceful tug of
the negative perspective.
In order to get a handle on these slippery,

implicit

assumptions which determine our attitude and practice

arbitrarily separated theory from practice.

I

have

The practice
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had to come first in order for me
to see the reality of
these perspectives.
But in this paper the theory
comes
first (the first three chapters).
Szasz (1961). Laing
(I960,

1961,

1967), Foucault (1954/1976. 1961/1973)
and

Sedgwick (1971) address some of the
philosophical issues and
the sociological determinants which
help to define my two
perspectives. My emphasis in the theoretical
sections is

quite different.

I

find that within the non-critical

literature itself these perspectives have a
tradition and
development beginning with Freud which have not
been suffi-

ciently recognized.

The scope of this paper is to remain

within this tradition of the psychoanalytic literature.
Once the parameters defining the contrast and tension of
the
two perspectives are drawn out in Chapters

I

through III,

I

will bring this theory and its implicatons for practice to
bear on the clinical activities of therapy, supervision, and

consultation in Chapter IV.
The chapters gradually develop the concept of the

positive perspective.

The way our implicit assumptions

about, and attitudes toward, symptomology influence our

notion of change and the psychotherapeutic process is the
central theme within which the positive perspective unfolds.
I

start from the most general, abstract, and philosophical

demarcating in Chapter

I

and become more particular, con-

crete, and experiential as the theme is carried toward
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Chapter IV.

Chapter

begins with the broadest
of overviews, with my language,
meta- theoretical
I

intent, and

definitions.

Toward the end of the chapter,
my notion of
the psychological symptom is
set out by contrast with
its
meaning and development within
medicine by fixing its
historical lineage and by defining
its unique, positive
perspective significance.
Chapter II then separates the
negative from the positive perspective.
Important qualities
of each are delineated, put in a
psychoanalytic

context, and

applied to the major, structural
components defining psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
In Chapter III,

I

move from more general theory to

situate the positive perspective in
specific, personal
theories.
I review the erratic course
of the positive
perspective in major, representative theorists
within the

psychoanalytic literature.

Beginning with the initial and

most important theorist, Sigmund Freud,

I

pursue in some

detail his brilliant successes and understandable
failures
in capturing the positive perspective from 1893
through

1920.

Freud's struggles to achieve the positive perspective

serve to exemplify its major components, especially its

consequences for psychotherapeutic change, as well as the
inherent resistance it offers to those plummeting its
enigmatic, illusive nature.

Each of the cited theorists

after Freud makes an important contribution and builds on
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Freud's ground breaking innovations
in theory and practice.
However, after Freud, I am drawn
most of all to D. W.
Winnicott.

He,

like Freud, had the courage to
allow enough
closeness with the other to empathically
discern the personal meaning of his story while
allowing room for the other
to come to be himself.
Heinz Kohut is my last major theorist.
He brings the positive perspective
into the current
era and into America.
Many other significant contributors
to the positive perspective have been
left unacknowledged.
These include Karen Homey, Margaret Mahler,
Harry Stack
Sullivan, Carl Rogers, Frederick Perls, Erik
Erikson,

Jacques Lacan, and Harold Searles, to name a few.
these are important.

All of

But those selected are just as repre-

sentative and influential and they especially furthered
the
conjunction of theory and practice.
Chapter IV grounds the theory in personal experience
and practical application.

First

discuss my own journey

I

in coming to understand the significance of the positive

perspective on symptomology

.

Then

I

discuss and exemplify

the theme in the three principal settings in which

been engaged as a clinical psychologist:
vision, and consultation.

I

have

therapy, super-

Abstract meta-theory is seen as

more important, and more practical, than technique.

The

progression of the chapters has been intended to allow the
crucial significance of the positive perspective to evolve.

.
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It is primarily

within these three settings
that ray own
meta-theoretical conception of the
positive perspective has
evolved.
I hope, after all, to
pass on my client's
insist-

ence that their discomforting
secret is real and worth
disentangling

CHAPTER

I

THEORY AND BACKGROUND OF SYMPTOMS
.

.

.

factors in our experience are
clear and

and vaguely.

(Whitehead, 1968? vi?)

d^c:^;r^^^

.

dimly

Theme
The history of psychoanalytic theory
and practice up
through the present has been dominated by
a one-sided,

negative perspective on psychologically deviant
thought and
behavior, that is, on symptomology
This negative
.

perspec-

tive is a superordinate, meta-theoretical
concept immanent
in the very language,

constructs, and assumptions of classi-

cal and modern psychoanalytic thought.

It permeates all of

the six metapsychological points of view (dynamic,
topo-

graphic, economic, structural, genetic, adaptive) which
are
said to comprise all of the ways of looking at psychological

phenomena.

Consequently, the orientation of psychother-

apists and the lay public alike toward symptomology and
towards those who are S3miptomatic tends to be negative.

negative
people,

I

By

mean all those characteristics which reduce

their actions and thoughts, to impersonal, mechan-

istic constructs or objects.

This reductionis tic view of

17
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our self-hood and its tormented
expression in symptomology
is characterized by a preoccupation
with the biological,

physicalistic, external world and a lack
of recognition of
the internal, dynamic world.
The negative perspective
psychology objectifies the activity and
personhood of tho se
who are identified as deviant and establishes
a qualitative
gulf between "normality" and symptomatic
conditions.

m

This

built-in distance and filtered discernment of
symptomology
in a broad sense precludes the growth of a more
adequate

psychodynamic theory, of a more realistic sense of the

phenomenological experience of the other.

For example, the

many layered complexity and rich, communicative nature of

a

symptom becomes reduced to the simplistic, unbalanced view
that symptoms express only pathology.

The implicit and

often not so implicit negative cast of our theory and
general outlook bears directly on how we conceive of change,
on our techniques in the psychotherapeutic process, and on
the overall treatment and care of the symptomatic population.
S3miptoms,

however, have a positive aspect.

The entire

gamut of our thinking and behavior, and especially that

which is symptomatic or deviant, contains a positive component which is developmental, dialogic, a present tense
striving for growth and mastery and an expression of a

creative core of selfhood.

A symptom is the observable
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communicative end product of both negative
and positive
forces.

It is a complex symbol of
deficit and adaptational

compromise on the one hand, together with
a camouflaged
rebelliousness positing reproach and a
current striving for
development of the self on the other. The
psychological
literature is remarkably devoid of a clear
and explicit

account of this dual nature of symptomology
and especially
of the positive part of the overall perspective.
All

forms

of symptomology, no matter whether fantasy,
regression,

resistance, transference, or anti-social acts, have
a positive developmental and object relational component.

The

practice of psychotherapy, supervision, and consultation
can
all be enriched and facilitated by the attempt to achieve

this neglected, positive perspective on symptomology.

Theoretical Orientation
The psychoanalytic framework is chosen as the basic

theoretical orientation for several reasons.

Perhaps the

major reason is that the historical influence of psychoanalytic thinking currently influences the way we identify and

characterize a symptom.
of our awareness.

Much of this influence operates out

Further, the very historical and psychol-

ogical reasons which caused early psychoanalytic thinking to
lose sight of the positive aspect of symptoms continue to

exert their blinding influence.

It is hoped that by
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examining the vicissitudes of the
positive perspective
within psychoanalytic theory we might
come to a better
understanding of our current difficulties
facilitating

psychotherapeutic change.

Secondly, all other non-

behavioral systems of psychological
thought are primarily
derived from, and make use of,
psychoanalytic
concepts.

Even the behavioral approach when utilized
with humans in
real life situations in, for example,
schools and half-way
houses, perceives the problematic symptom
much as a
non-

behaviorist would, no matter how quantified in
form.
often passes for behaviorism in the field is
little

What

more

than an attempt to provide security for the service
provider

by mechanizing a relationship.

This obj ectif ication of a

person and a relationship lies at the core of what is
wrong

with some of the meta- theory of psychoanalytic thought.
Lastly, only the psychoanalytic framework provides the
depth,

the dynamic theory, to adequately comprehend and

unify the apparent variety of symptoms to be found in the

many settings in which a clinical psychologist might work.
Within the overall context of a psychoanalytic orientation,

this paper will be limited to the object rela-

tional branch supported by the language of self psychology.
This specific theoretical orientation provides both frame-

work and content.

The historical development and vicissi-

tudes of object relational self psychology parallel the
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developments and fixations in the positive
nature of symptomology.
The positive aspect of symptomology
and its
practical use are most explicit in this
approach.

Meta-Theory and Metapsychology
Unquestionably the basic assumptions, the
meta-theory
of psychoanalytic thinking, influences all
the rest
of the

theorizing and practice in ways both subtle and
obvious.
This might seem self-evident but this paper is
precisely

about the profound consequences of an unexamined meta-theory
and of psychology's indifference and even hostility to

examining first principles.
The present day psychoanalytic negative perspective is
a consequence of insufficient attention to Freud's struggle

with some basic meta- theoretical issues.
premises vacillated significantly.

Freud's major

The fact that "Freud's

metapsychological writings are neither complete nor systematic and are scattered throughout his writings" (Greenson,
1967, p.

20)

has made detection difficult of one of these

major vacillations.
Prior to 1920, Freud was working toward the position,

though with great difficulty, that people have a fundamental
striving toward mastery and "restoration."

This was mani-

fest in both the internal and external words in repetition.

For example, a psychotic

's

hallucination repeats memories.

.
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Freud attributes this repetition
to the teleological speculation that the mental replaying
is an attempt at recovery,
an attempt to regain the lost
object, an attempt "to restore
a libidinal cathexis to the ideas
of objects"

(1915/1957b)
This principle is seen in dreams,
fantasy and hallucination,
play, humor, and in neurotic and
psychotic symptoms.

Further, Freud makes the repetitive urge
the essence of the
psychoanalytic concepts of transference and
resistance.
This formulation represented a radical
transformation of the

medical-psychological thought of the time.

What appeared as

meaningless, pathological, and wholly negative
was, for as
long as Freud could sustain this revolutionary
perspective,
meaningful, a striving for health, and hopeful.
In 1920

(

Beyond the Pleasure Principle ) Freud (1920/

1955) made a radical turnabout which altered the course of

all the psychoanalytic thinking to follow.
tive now became negative.

What was posi-

Repetition was still meaningful

but was reformulated as a principle of stasis and death.

There was a corresponding change in his view on symptomology.

The psychoanalytic community and the Western world

became entrapped in one aspect of symptomology

.

This most

significant event largely passed without notice and still
remains in relative obscurity.

Perhaps the boldness and

drama of Freud's 1920 paper was blinding.

Perhaps the

paper filled a great need of the time for order and more
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simplistic unifying principles.

Certainly Freud's abandon-

ment of a positive view of symptomology
provided for psychotherapists and the lay public a reassuring
distance from
madmen, from those who might provoke
in us unsettling
questions about the nature of our sanity.
In
essence, this

was scapegoating wrought from the
power of an unquestioned

meta-theoretical principle reified into
psychoanalytic metapsychology.
Established (and establishment) psychoanalysts
and
psychoanalytic societies have little interest in
questioning
first principles.
Elements of the neglected positive
per-

spective on symptomology have been knocking on the
door of
American psychoanalysis for decades but few have dared
to
even greet the stranger.

British school thinking (e.g.,

Fairbarin, Winnicott, Gun trip) and the French Lacanians
have

found the courage to radically confront established doctrine
and pick up the threads of Freud's pre-1920 more truly

psychodynamic thinking.

In so doing they have been gradual-

ly changing the meta-theoretical base and correcting the

long-standing theory and practice of an overly negative
perspective.

However, much of this has been resisted by the

Americans as though it were a life and death struggle.
The major and representative American combatant is Roy

Schaf er (1976, 1978) who wants to dispense with the danger

of a radically altered perspective (actually, only a more
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balanced perspective) by sounding the
death knell for metapsychology.
In a surprising reformulation.

Schafer shed his

long history of influential texts on
testing (Rappaport,
Gill & Schafer, 1968; Schafer, 1948,
1954, 1967).
He even
abandoned his incisive, brilliant organization
of the then
still radical, qualitative and structural
ego psychology

approach (Schafer, 1968), radical despite Freud's
construction of these principles almost twenty years
before.
Schafer

's

boldness and ability to critique metapsychological

issues had long been in evidence.

But it appears that

Schafer has decided to take a shortcut and instead of

disputing the new meta-theory and the altered metapsychology
of the object relational and self psychology theorists, he

claims to dispense with metapsychology altogether (Schafer,
1976,

1978).

Schafer does not clarify exactly what he means

by metapsychology.

He does not distinguish metapsychology

from meta-theory and he decides not to analyze those changes
VTrought in metapsychology on account of the positive per-

spective impact.

Instead, he cloaks himself in a professed

return to the starting point of the clinical data itself and
introduces a "new language of action for the old one of

metapsychology" (1978,

p.

xi)

.

The "new language of action"

eschews nouns and adjectives and is based on the use of

verbs and adverbs.
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Schafer's "new a-metapsychological"
approach is
neither new nor without metapsychology
There is a desperation in the sweeping boldness
of instituting a new language
and in the tedious detailing of
its application.
Schafer
marshalls his considerable skills
derived from life-long
immersement in psychoanalytic theory
to ward off the danger
he senses is challenging the American
establishment.
.

His

approach is old in the sense that it
post-dates Gestalt
therapeutic theory by thirty years. Perls,
Hefferline,

and

Goodman (1951) were enunciating "techniques
of awareness"
and methods of more directly "contacting
the environment"
and were advocating the use of action language
long before
Schafer's new ideas found print.
He does not even acknowledge them.
Schafer's approach is not without metapsychology in the sense that he makes some of the same
existential
and psychoanalytic assumptions as do the Gestalt
therapists.

However, most damaging of all is the sad fact that Schafer's

approach is neither new nor without metapsychology in its
implicit, basic orientation.

Behind the veneer of newness,

its fundamental essence as Freudian post-1920 structural

psychology is clearly discernible.

Schafer's camouflaged

premise laying slightly behind all the new language is
Freud's famous dictum in The Ego and the Id (1923/1961) that
the conscious ego
(p.

27).

"...

is first and foremost a body-ego"

The verbs, adverbs and nouns he still must use
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presuppose the psychoanalytic concepts
of warring instincts,
of dynamic forces acting within a
tripartite structure.
First principles remain and their
importance is underlined
by Schafer's vehement attempt to deny
them.

Assumptions and first principles can't be
ignored but
much of it in psychoanalytic thought has
remained at an
implicit level, perhaps because of Freud's
unsystematic
approach to it (Rappaport & Gill, 1959). There

are other,

just as compelling reasons for the peculiar lack
of recognition of a whole set of assumptions which have,
nevertheless,

been formative in guiding psychology, theory and technique.
These dimly and vaguely perceived assumptions have remained
in a shadowy realm and few have dared to challenge them.

These assumptions have remained in the "background of

thought" because they were syntonic with the needs of the
fledgling, peculiar enterprise of psychology.

Psychology

needed a scientific base to gain credibility and it needed a
way of distancing from the unsettling, constant exposure to
the unconscious and to madness.

Sociologically it needed to

align itself with the status quo and thus its metapsychology
itself became a "symptom" of socio-economic-political

realities of that time.

This metapsychology, the unbalanced

assumptions of the negative perspective, continue to haunt
us.

The abstractions of metapsychology are very real in
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their all too human derivation
vdciun, the^iy
rneir -.-r^
immanence, and their
down-to-earth consequences.

Meta-theory and metapsychology
as used in this paper
require further defining. Until
1915 Freud used metapsychology to mean only that which
was beyond

conscious appre-

hension (Rappaport & Gill,
1959,

p.

153).

In a footnote to

Freud (1915/1957b) states that
the intention of metapsychology
is to clarify and carry
deeper the theore1915.

.

.

tical assumptions on which a
psycho-analytic system could be
founded" (p. 222).
It is the convergence of both
these
general, early Freudian meanings, that
which lies behind our
conscious thought and the notion of our
fundamental theoretical assumptions, that is important
for grasping the
significance of the overall permeance of the
positive and

negative perspectives.

This general, transcendent meaning

of metapsychology, before metapsychology took
on its spe-

cialized meaning in later psychoanalytic thought
as consisting of six viewpoints, is synonymous with my
use of
meta-theory.

Psychoanalytic metapsychology is now based on six
points of view although Freud used only three:

the dynamic,

the topographic and the economic (Rappaport & Gill, 1959,
p.
153).

Modern clinical psychoanalytic practice holds that,

in the course of "working through," all six metapsychological

28

points of view (dynamic, topographic,
economic, genetic,
structural, adaptive) should be
employed (Greenson,

1967, p.

When the term meta^s^cholo^
21)
is used in this paper
it is only referring to this
later development in which
metapsychology took on a more specialized
meaning.
It may be objected that the
six points of view constitute the total meaning of the alleged
superordinate concept
of meta-theory.
Isn't it true that no matter how
we view
basic assumptions one or more of the
recognized points
.

of

view will more clearly, more explicitly
convey the desired
meaning? The answer is that all six
points of view are
themselves tainted by a transcendental
point
of view:

positive and negative perspectives.

the

This requires further

explanation.
In order to best highlight the effect which
first

order,

implicit assumptions have had on the overall theory

and practice of psychoanalysis and the derivative non-

analytic psychotherapies, it is necessary to avoid identification with the tainted, metapsychological terms.
example,

For

the topographic point of view posits a perspective

which encompasses and speaks to the general characteristics
of the unconscious-conscious dichotomy.

This point of view

might be utilized together with the motive forces of the
dynamic points of view and the aetiological factors of the
genetic point of view to explicate the phenomenon of the
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fitful appearance of the positive
perspective.
T^e problem
with using these points of view is
that each of them contains assumptions of a reductionistic
mechanistic, objectifying nature which devalue and render
meaningless the
.

radical positive perspective at the outset.
The lack of consciousness of those
unconscious elements in the dynamic point of view, for
example, is said to
be a product of the threatening instinctual
nature
of the

unconscious elements.

These unconscious elements are either

instincts themselves or internalized representations
asso-

ciated with instincts.

The true unconscious make-up of

object relations, in a general sense, made up of social,
political, economic and other interactional factors, could

never get a fair hearing.
It might also be objected that the adaptational point

of view contains the essence of what is meant by the posi-

tive perspective.

In a way this is so,

for the adaptational

notion carries the seeds of the positive perspective.
However, it is far from identical with it.

Before explain-

ing the differences, the adaptive point of view requires

definition.
The adaptive point of view is now recognized by

psychoanalytic theory as a legitimate and separate point of

view although Freud never explicitly used it (Greenson,
1967, p.

25).

Hartmann and Erikson are best known for

.
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developing this point of view which
they equated with an
"inborn preparedness for an evolving
series of average
expectable environments" (Rappaport
& Gill,
1959, pp.

160)

159-

.

Rappaport and Gill (1959) summarize
the four basic
assumptions of the adaptive point of
view as used by Freud,

Erikson (1950, 1968), Hartmann
(1939/1958), Fenichel (1954)
and Spitz (1957)
:

There exist psychological states of
adaptedness and
Pr°^^sses of adaption at every point of life
Cb) The processes of (autoplastic and/or
alloplastic)
adaptation maintain, restore, and improve the
existing states of adaptedness and thereby
ensure
survival
(c) Man adapts to his society--both to
the physical and
human environments which are its products
(d) Adaptation relationships are mutual:
man 'and environment adapt to each other.
(pp. 159-160)
(a)

Further reference will be made to these assumptions
of
the adaptational point of view in Chapter III.

Although the

development of these assumptions is important for seeing
positive aspects of the symptom, as will be developed later,
it is now necessary to note the differences of this psycho-

analytic concept compared with the positive perspective.
All of these assumptions of the adaptive point of view

remain tied to a mechanistic view of man.

The inherent,

positive, adaptive processes still treat man simply as the

vector summation of impersonal forces.

The inner forces are

still ultimately derived from the id or from conflicting
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instincts.

Even the more advanced ego
psychology notion of
a conflict free ego sphere lacks
the concept of an inherently vital self and is overly derived
from impersonal,
social forces.

This criticism may especially seem
unfair to
Erikson because of his attempts to
"socialize" the ego and
to try to convey a more human sense
of subjective reality

through his concepts of identity and the
life cycle (1950,
1968).
However, despite these advances in ego
psychology
remains tied to a devitalized ego.

he

Thus, while the adaptive

viewpoint may lead to the practical consequence
of allowing
the symptom to be seen in something less than
a purely

negative light, the fullness of its positive vitality, its
developmental striving, its nature as a communicative,
personal extension of the self remains unappreciated.

Definition of the Symptom
S3rmptom is used in this paper in its most common-

place and ordinary of meanings.

However, a good part of the

intent of this theme is to stress the uncommon view that

symptoms are not just a sign or indication of something
else.

They are not just past history being repeated in the

present.

They are not just an aspect of anxiety or regres-

sion or anything else.

Symptoms are creative expressions of

the self and they exist in their own right.

While they may

"express" the past they fully "live" in the present.

In the
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psychoanalytic world the fullness of
their present reality
has received insufficient
attention.
Behaviorism has recognized and stressed the utility of
taking the symptom
seriously, but it treats the symptom
only as something bad,
something to be eradicated.
Behaviorism fails to appreciate
the reality and meaning fulness of
the symptom while, ironically, claiming nothing but the
symptom is important.
In

the end, behaviorism is no better than
psychoanalysis in its
depreciation of the symptom.

Symptom encompasses both thought and
physical
behavior.
Its appearance is marked, first

of all, by suf-

ficient deviance which at any given period
of history might
attract our attention.
The deviance of a symptomatic
thought or behavior is necessary but far from
sufficient for
defining the symptom.
Its deviant quality, in the sense of

something being wrong, beyond the ken of normality, has
been
the orientation of the negative perspective.

Deviance is

often implicitly extended to mean a difference that is off
the continuum of normality, a quantitative difference.

This

clearly was the belief of Kraeplin (Zilboorg, 1941/1967,
454) and we have inherited his legacy.

p.

The implication that

symptomatic deviance indicates a quantitatively different
state of affairs is rarely sanctioned in theoretical orien-

tations today but it remains common in practice.
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A symptom is almost always a
composite, a complex of
more than one thought or action.
The composite nature of a
symptom makes its precise, defining
boundaries difficult to
discern.

In practice it is often
impossible to tell where
one symptom ends and another
begins.
Symptoms are far less

discrete than we pretend they are.
is,

Any particular symptom

in fact, nothing less than a
glimpse of the total per-

son.

Its defining nature is ultimately
inexhaustible, like

a symbol or a dream.

As Sarte so eloquently says:

.man is a totality and not a collection.
Consequently he expresses himself as a whole
in even his most
insignificant and his most superficial behavior
"""-i/^'^
other words there is not a taste, a mannerism,
or an
human act which is not revealing.
(1956, p. 568).
.

.

Symptoms express this totality and so any given
symptom can
serve as a way in for understanding the client.
The complex of thought and action that make
up a

symptom is characterized by a coherent and unifying
scheme
to which we attribute meaning and cause.

However, the

scheme utilized in the negative perspective only takes the

negative meaning into account.

Symptoms become classified

into relatively exclusive categories and usually there is

more than one symptom per category.

But again, the cate-

gories denote only negativity.
Sjnuptoms tend to be repeated.

This repetitive nature

of a symptom is another important part of its definition,

albeit a negative one in traditional psychological circles.
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T^is repetitive quality is
sometimes associated with
inertia, or character armour (Reich.
1933/1945). or resistance,
transference, inertia, and the death
instinct (Freud).
However, the very repetitiveness
of a symptom may be seen
in
another, more positive light:
attempted mastery and communication.
This negative approach to
symptomology originated in medicine.
For a variety of reasons,
psychology in
its infancy found the medical
model a fertile ground for the
adoption of these aspects of the negative
perspective.

Psychology and Medicine
Clinical psychological thought has tended to
borrow
the vocabulary and assumptions of medicine
at the beginning

of this century.

At that time, the most essential aspect of

a symptom was its descriptive power in being
able to alert a

trained observer to an underlying, pathological process.

A

symptom was always a sign of something else, even though
the
symptom itself might be quite serious and life threatening.

Freud and psychoanalytic theory grew out of this medical
legacy.

The succession of assumptions from the pre-Freudian

medical legacy to Freud is best seen in the monumental
nosological system fathered by Kraeplin.
As Zilboorg (1941/1967) points out. Kraeplin (18551936) was a systematizer and his interest was only in the

most general, descriptive qualities of those noteworthy
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behaviors seen as deviant at that
time.
He wasn't interested in the particular, more
personal content of thought
but only in its most general
form.
Science would have none
of the romantic folly of getting
too personal.
his

m

pursuit of facts he remained tied
to an emphasis on abstract
categorization of external phenomena.
He essentially retained the physicalist base akin to
the physics or chemistry
of the eighteenth century as
opposed to a more contemporary
biology "which deals with the phenomena
of life in a more
comprehensive and much less impersonal fashion
than it might
at first appear" (Zilboorg,
p. 454).
One of the direct
consequences of this was the view that disease
exists as a

separate entity from health and so mental
illness is discontinuous with normality.

Kraeplin's impersonal and detached physicalist
system
might also be seen as a continuation of the medieval,
theological tenet that "all illness, including mental
illness, must be physical" (Zilboorg, p. 467).

The theo-

logical fear that God's existence might be questioned if the
God substance in man, his soul, is seen as imperfect, subtly

reinforces the medical, physicalist base of the negative
perspective.

Whatever the sources, Kraeplinian thinking identified
symptoms with the separate entity of psychological disease
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and reduced psychological reality
further by assuming that
behind the underlying psychological
pathology was an even
more basic, physical, organic
pathology.
For example.
Kraeplin states:
""^^ ^^^^^
iharactPrf^^H^f^''^^''?^^''
Characterized form of disease, and represents a well
we arp inQt^l
fied xn regarding the majority
at least -oltSe clinical
^h^^h^^^ brought together here as
the expresl^nTlf' ^'''^^^
process, though outwardly ?hey
nf?!

Freud, of course, also hoped and
believed that some day a

physical pathological process (chemical)
would in fact be
found as the root cause of symptoms appearing
as psychological deviance (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1955,
XXIV).
p.

This notion of psychological symptoms being
expressive

of something else, of an underlying pathology
and even of a
physically based deviancy in the body's machinery,
was

considered enlightened thinking (Szasz, 1961).

"Progressive

scientific thinking" of the 19th and early 20th centuries
looked disdainfully at the earlier "folly" of lumping

together malingerers, criminals, and the insane (Foucault,
1961/1973; Rosen, 1968).
as real

Seeing psychological symptomology

(not laziness or malingering) and as organically

based as medical symptomology (not as possessed by the
devil) legitimized psychology but at a very high price
(Szasz,

1961).
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As psychology uncritically
adopted the medical model
of symptomology, psychoanalytic
thinking became burdened
with the nominal fallacy.
The assumptions of Emil

Kraeplin's classification of mental
illnesses in 1883 b ecame
part of all the clinical psychology
which followed. Name s
were given to the unseen, inferred,
underlying pathological
processes which, in parallel to the
medical model, had to
exist because of the existence of
symptoms.
Symptoms
existed because of the existence of the
underlying pathology.
These names for psychological pathology
came to assume
an unquestioned reality.
Because the name existed therefore
the referent must exist.
These pathological ghosts lying
behind symptoms made the symptoms themselves appear
only in
a negative light,

an indication of insidious processes which

were all the more frightening, grave and serious,
precisely

because they were unseen.
There is another major aspect to the high price psy-

chology paid in finding credibility by adopting the early

medical model's theory of symptomology.

Psychology, by the

inherent nature of its subject matter, by being burdened

with a much more complex aetiological problem than medicine,
was unable to keep up with medicine's rapidly increasing

sophistication about the complexity of a symptom.

Psychol-

ogy was forced into a ceaseless exploration of one elusive

causative factor after another precluding the opportunity
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for sophisticated elaboration.

Medicine, by the inherent

nature of its subject matter,
had a much easier time in
finding simple, direct, physical
and thus observable and
testable aetiological factors.
With a basic and relatively
unchanging aetiological core medicine
could afford to
turn
its attention to the complex
composite of pathological and

repairative processes which make up
a symptom.
Even though
psychology came to assume field theories
of multiple causation (Rosen, 1968, p. 245), the
dual nature of any given
symptom was obscured by the scant attention
to any
specific

determinant of that symptom.

Psychological "disease enti-

ties" could not be established with
reference to indeterminate aetiological factors so the apparent
coalescence of
symptoms was reified into a psychological
disease.
Once
again ghosts derived from a dubious source,
however this
time the net effect was an over-simplifying
of symptoms and
an over-emphasis on their most observable negative
features.

During the Nineteenth century a symptom in medicine

meant little more than an observable feature of an unseen
pathological process.

Medicine had a simplistic and one-

sided notion of symptoms being wholly negative and a direct

expression of the hidden illness.

There was little appre-

ciation for the many unseen bodily systems which converged
into forming what an observer might detect as being note-

worthy and deviant.

As the body's immunological and

.

,

defensive systems were better
understood a symptom came to
be viewed as a complex phenomenon
embodying the sum total
at any given time, of many
mechanisms and forces from within
and without.
While the medical profession has
become considerably
more sophisticated in its understanding
of symptomology
psychological theory has remained fixated
at a more simplistic level.
The evidence of our diagnostics
as exemplified by the one sided language and
content of DSM-Ill
(Spitzer, 1980) and by past and current
psychoanalytic
theory is that we have failed to achieve even
the psychological equivalent of the medical model's
view of syniptomology.

Specifically, we have missed the notion of an
heuristically dynamic body which is alive with
regenerative

potential.

Even accepting psychological structures correla-

tive with that of medicine, ours in comparison are
flat,
lifeless, overly abstract and mechanical.
It is a curious irony that psychiatry and clinical

psychology should actually be accused of fixation at a more
primitive level than medicine regarding the narrowness in
its understanding of symptoms.

After all, it is said

(Zilboorg, 1941/1967, p. 488) that one of Freud's major

historical breakthroughs is his focusing on the total person
rather than on Kraeplin's nosological categories or on specific anatomical structures.

And to the lajmian, psychology
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is supposed to deal with the
person, with what is most
alive
about us.
Perhaps in its flight

from suspicion of spiri-

tualism and vagueness and in its
pursuit of a respectable
positivistic base, psychoanalytic
clinical psychological
thought has wrung the life and autonomy
from its subject
matter.
Frieda Fromm-Reichmann is one of
the notable
exceptions to the failure of the extended
psychoanalytic
community to understand the positive,
vital aspect of
physical symptoms in medicine and then see
the possibility
and importance of this notion for
psychological symptomology:

Every general practitioner knows that many
physical
symptoms are not only the expression of the
patient's
disease but also an expression of the tendency
in the
physical organism toward regaining health.
(1959, p.

5)

The same holds true for processes of mental
illness
Its symptoms, too, both express the illness
and show the
mentally disturbed person's tendency toward mental
health, that is, toward adjustive success in his relationships with other people.
(1959, p. 6).
S3nnptom as Communication

Implicit in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann

'

s

view of the

symptom's expression of a "tendency toward mental health" is
the S3nnptom's communicative nature.

Symptoms can, of

course, readily be seen as the expression of a problem but
for those willing to make a radical change of perspective

they also express their positive meaning.

The language of
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this meaning is far from discursive.

Thomas Szasz (1961),

taking his cue from Freud's
observations in 1895 that
hysterical symptoms could be seen as
a pictorial form of
non-verbal communication (Freud,
1895/1955), calls this
language of symptoms "protolanguage "
Protolanguage is
relatively non-discursive, iconic or
pictorial; it tends
.

to be relatively idiosyncratic, and
especially has an

"...
..."

object-seeking and relationship-maintaining
function
(Szasz,

1961, p. 299).

The word "relative" is fre-

quently used because the language of symptoms
is on a continuum with discursive language.
It is only a matter of
degree of difference within any dimension that
"crazy talk"
differs from "normal talk."
The iconic language of symptoms may be a "proto" or

simpler and inferior language when it comes to efficiency
at
a purely cognitive level but in its symbolic nature
it is

more vivid, terse, dynamic and complex.

Sechehaye (1951a, b)

simply calls this language symbolic and sees it as having a

unique power in being as close as possible to the actual,
personal, historic coinage of the initial conflicts.

The

symbolic type of expression is more directly the equivalent
of real experience, real affect, and tends to communicate
this more poignantly.

conduit for empathy.

It can thus serve effectively as a

The talent for psychotherapy rests on

sensitivity to this mode of relating.

.

,
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The language of psychological
symptomology is a universal language which is naturally
employed to both conceal
and reveal.
Its indirectness, as Szasz
(1961) suggests, is
part of the overall indirectness
dictated by social reality.
Our needs are expressed ever more
indirectly as the social
matrix becomes more sophisticated,
complex, or close knit.
Too much directness causes conflict
and impedes the smooth
functioning of the social group. Humor
is a good example of
a mode of highly symbolic communication
which, like the
symptom, utilizes indirectness to express
ideas, needs and
wishes so as to minimize open conflict.
Freud, in his

famous papers on humor (1905/1960, 1927/1961)
held that

humor essentially has its roots in aggression and
is a
relatively civilized way of expressing this aggression

utilizing a variety of disguises.

The symptom, like humor,

has survival value in its indirectness and presents
a

slippery facade, a caginess which resists our probing (Lukens
1977)

The concealment role of the symptomatic form of inter-

personal communication is extremely important and must be

respected by the inquiring therapist.

Besides the potential

richness and primitive directness of this form of relating,
the need for this degree of concealment is a clear indica-

tion of the riskiness involved.

Symptoms, as Freud repeat-

edly pointed out, are over-determined and it takes prolonged
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suffering and many small blows,
perceived by that individual
as traumas, before a symptom
becomes manifest.
Concealment
allows a relatively safe outlet
for bruised parts of the
self.

The concealment function of
symptoms provides safety
against possible further loss of
love, responsiveness, and
empathy while allowing the
intrinsically active self to
express its hurt to itself and
others.
The self requires a
certain amount of responsiveness
and empathy especially in
its earlier stages of development.
The self is active and
expressive and cannot check its continual
impingement on
external and internalized reality.
The external environment
may experience this impingement and
even this need for

responsiveness as threatening, as anxiety
provoking for a
variety of reasons.
Perhaps there is a misfit between
mother (or father) and child in terms of innate
dispositional factors such as activity level or the
amount and
forcefulness of stimulation required for each to
experience
adequate responsiveness in the other. Or perhaps, as
is

more often the case, the parents experience personal impingement as aggression or control or some other form of
infringement threatening to over-tax their already diminished resources.

The child learns to selectively attenuate

his impingement to minimize this threat to his environment
so as to maintain the greatest possible responsiveness under

.
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the circumstances (externally
and in the internalized

world)

Over time, selective attenuation
of impingement, a
dissociation or false self (Winnicott)
detour from normal
development, leads to clearer
symptomology as the appropriately successful disguises are
tried out and incorporated.
Every symptom thus derives from
specific failures of the
environment and bears the specific
imprint of that failure.
This is part of what the symptom
reveals in a negative
sense:
the environmental failure and the
deficit in the
self.

This negative revelation is irritating
to the parents
who have failed and may even serve to
prompt some potentially positive action, such as bringing
the youth in to see
a therapist.

But the aetiology of the failure is only

hinted at, concealed by its expression in another
language.
Direct conflict and challenge remain hidden.
The bruised
self has safely spoken.

Symptomatic language thus provides relatively safe

feedback about the pathology of parents, or even of the
extended parental environment, the pathology of some part of
society.

Symptoms always occur in, and have their develop-

ment in a social matrix.

They are part of a never ending

dialogue of alienation, of oppressors and the oppressed.
Those who are less powerful must conceal their message of
reproach.

But they must also express it or give up their
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naturally active self, their
reality altogether. John Rosen
(1968) based his radical therapy of
psychotics in the 1940s
on the revolutionary doctrine
that no matter how dissociated
and psychotic the patient, no
matter how withdrawn and
disguised his communication, he was
always communicating.
But in any age the idea of seeing
meaning in the oppressed
language of symptoms is never popular.
Rosen found that
"The idea of paying attention to

psychotics-listening to

them and trying to understand them
psychologically-seemed
to be considered ridiculous or even
bizarre"
(1968, p.

7).

The therapist, analyst, counsellor or
teacher who

would allow him (her) -self to see that symptoms
have meaning, that they communicate, and that they
are the disguised
language of the oppressed has, upon that recognition,
put

himself in opposition to the status quo.

This is extremely

important to recognize especially for the practical
application of the theory.

"Seeing" the positive, communicative,

object relational, and developmental aspect of symptomology

requires a letting down of ordinary personal boundaries and

immersement in a shared reality or dialogic experience with
another.

In short,

it requires the activation of empathy

without loss of self.

The value of dwelling on the meta-

psychology of the positive perspective is hopefully a
freeing of one's empathic capacity with consequent freeing
of the need in those symptomatic for disguised expression of

46

their reproach and of their
developing real self.
This
approach (as opposed to
medication and obj ectif
ication)
requires boldness and courage
and the willingness to
confront opposition.
This opposition is from
society in
general, from the specific
setting in which one works,
from
the internalized societal
injunctions in those symptomatic
and in oneself, and from our
individual and societal defenses against awareness of the
consequences of being fully
alive.

a

CHAPTER

II

THE NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
PERSPECTIVES
ON SYMPTOMOLOGY
The Negative Perspective

^'^^
(ii) certain defensive
namely a combination ofconsSlIat^on^'of'thrego
nonspecific manif estafiins of
ego weakness and a shift toward
primary-process ?Mnkfn
on the one hand, and specific
primitive defense mecS ^
anisms (splitting, primitive idealization
ea?lv lorms
of projection, denial, omnipotence),
and on ?he othS
°f int4rnalized object
il^ll^
relations; and (iv) characteristic
instinctual Vicissitudes, namely, a particular pathological
condensation
of pregenital and genital aims under
?he overriding
influence of pregenital aggressive needs
'

(Kernberg, 1975, p. 44).

Delineation.

'

"

'

The negative perspective is, first of all,

that point of view in psychology and in society
overall

which sees only the negative aspects of symptomology
or
psychological deviance.

The negative perspective is also

that particular attitude and its consequences for the

therapeutic process which reduce the totality of the sympto-

matic person and the totality of his personal expression to
impersonal obj ectif ication

.

The negative perspective has

been used so exclusively, so invar iantly and for so long
that we as a society, as a scientific community and as

practitioners have lost sight of the negative.
47

48

reductionistic cast of our psychological language
and
premises and especially of the effect this
has on

those

labeled symptomatic.

Negative in the first sense refers to almost
all of
the long accepted psychological terminology which
denotes
only a deficit, a loss, a more primitive stage than
the rest
of us enjoy, or more usually a "diseased" or "pathological"

These deviant conditions (e.g., schizophrenia)

state.

frequently imply a qualitatively different state of affairs
for those classifiable under DSM 111 (Spitzer, 1980) from

those not classifiable.

That is, instead of seeing psycho-

logical deviancy on a continuum from more to less deviant,

instead of allowing that we all share the same human condition and our differences are only a matter of degree, the

negative perspective tends toward the position that madness,
no matter how slight, exists as a separate entity.

This

negative view of symptomology carries the connotation of
badness, wrongness, and always is flavored by a pejorative
quality.

The pejorative quality of the negative perspective

also carries the implication of a lack of reality, of an
emptiness, of something not important in its own right.
Thus a symptom is never valued in itself but is only the

unimportant appearance of a more fundamental process or
condition.

The symptom itself thus is of consequence only
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insofar as it allows an
interpretation or medication to
eradicate it.
The symptom thus tends to
be ignored, not
listened to, and the past and
future eclipse the present.
Negative further denotes dehumanization
and depersonalization.
The essential human condition
of dynamism,
vitality, developmental object
related striving and coimnunication is reduced to impersonal forces
driving an otherwise
inert machine.
Reduced as well is the breadth of
reality.
External reality becomes over-valued
while internal reality
is barely considered to be real.
As mentioned in Chapter

I,

a large part of this sim-

plistic, one-sided view of symptomology is
derived from an

unsophisticated medical model formulated before
the influence of immuniological systems were recognized.
Richard
Totman (1979) contends that even present day
medicine has a
myopic preoccupation with a reductionistic perspective.

His

analysis of psychosomatic phenomena from a medical standpoint captures some of the defining features of the negative

perspective in psychology.

He holds that there is a

medical- social orientation which operates out of our awareness.

This enshrouding background severely limits our

understanding of the psychosomatic component in almost all
disease.

Totman starts with the explicit assumption that

"While it used to be thought that there were just a few
'pure' psychosomatic conditions, now it is generally held

.
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that most,

if not all. diseases have
a psychosomatic component" (1979, pp. 15-16). He then
essentially argues that
this seemingly obvious fact has
been and remains obscured

from medical theory because "scientific
thinking about
disease
betrays a fundamentally physicalistic
.

.

.

,

or

mechanistic, orientation to the concept
of illness.
It
treats the individual, the 'patient,'
as a biological black
box; a complicated piece of machinery
inside which events

are assumed to take place in a law-like
way"

(p.

29).

Totman's conclusion is that this underlying
mechanistic
model of cause and effect in Western
industrialized societies allows only a restricted view of health
and illness.
This has profound consequences both in terms
of limiting

the

efficacy of treatment and in terms of the medical
attitude

which regards a person seeking treatment as
hardware"

(p.

a

"piece of

13)

As important as the reductionistic

,

physicalist base

is in limiting medicine's ability to comprehend and treat

illness,

it is even more limiting and destructive in the

psychotherapeutic world of psychology.

The negative per-

spective has lost sight of the whole person and of the

reality that

S3niiptoms

are an expression of the self.

The

multi- faceted eloquence of s3nmptoms has been ignored in
favor of static, lifeless, unmotivated abstractions denoting

only negativity.

Reality itself has been shrunk to exclude
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all that might challenge
the power of the
psychological
status quo.
That is, the internal world
with its self-

motivated, developmental striving
for object relatedness.
for con^unity, is itself the
locus and agent of change.
To
recognize that a therapist does
not make change happen,
is
not the prime ingredient in
change but only a facilitator
of
"good enough" (Winnicott,
1958/1975, 1971) conditions,
directly challenges the therapeutic
community's needs for
effectance and control.
The negative perspective, when it
accurately identifies and assesses a symptom, is
useful in first receiving
the communication that something is
wrong.
Unquestionably
this is a necessary first step for
everyone.
This in
itself, of course, is a skill capable
of much refinement
both in the formal setting of diagnostic
interview or

testing as well as in everyday therapy and
consultingactivities.

The literature is filled with this aspect
of

hearing the symptom's communication.

However, even this

first step in the diagnostic process is intrinsically
linked
to the values and needs of a specific setting, of
the

current psychology establishment, and to society.

been explicated quite thoroughly by
1967),

for example.

R.

D.

This has

Laing (1960, 1961,

This identification of symptoms, its

merits and pitfalls, is closely tied to many of the problems
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associated with the negative
perspective but is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The negative perspective
especially becomes destructive for the process of therapy
when it becomes the only
mode of relating to the other. For
the therapist, understanding is diminished, empathy is
difficult if not impossible, interpretations are unfreeing
and may be experienced
as punitive, and a therapeutic
alliance never gets started.
The client gets bound to the therapist
in a recapitulation
of society's structure of power to
powerlessness of oppressor to oppressed.
Further, the client becomes imprisoned
,

either to his medication or to his heightened
self-

consciousness about all that is mentally wrong with
him,
about his madness (Foucault, 1961/1973). He is
now labeled
and shackled to the negative implications of that
label.

Unless the therapist can somehow transcend the convenience
that accrues from labeling in the negative perspective
the

client is left without response to the hopeful cry of the
symptom.

A response to the deficit part of the symptom is

better than none at all and is the first step in that
dialogue needed for growth.

But disillusionment, further

interiorization, dissociation, "acting out," passivity and

entrenchment of the symptom may occur if a positive perspective cannot be achieved long enough or consistently enough

by the therapist.

When the negative perspective holds sway
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and unawares we treat the
client as an object we
are instrumental in distracting and
discouraging the client from
allowing creative, developmentally
motivated and object
seeking selfhood to risk change
and action in the outer
world.

Psychoanalytic conrppi-s.

Prior to 1920 (Beyond the
PI easure

Principle), Freud (1920/1955)
frequently toyed with the
notion, derived from watching the
play of his children, of
there being an innate striving for
mastery and relatedness
in almost all forms of deviant
phenomena.
This important
development of the positive perspective
will be further
elaborated in Chapter III.
Suffice it to say that in 1920
Freud,

in a curious piece of labored logic,
did an about

face and lost his radical nerve.

After over twenty years of

nurturing and teasing out the well hidden and
quite subtle
positive perspective he suddenly equated one
of the mainstays of the positive perspective, the principle
of

repeti-

tion, with the principle of conservation and
death.

The

main exponent of an independent selfhood striving for
development and creatively expressing its need for a responsive environment both for normal growth and to overcome
its dissociative retreats was effectively dead.

Freud

retreated to a structuralist position which brought clarity
to his work but at great cost.

The psychoanalytic estab-

lishment and psychological community inherited a legacy of
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concepts crucial to an understanding
of psychotherapy but
missing the critical notion of
the dual nature of
symptomology.

R-iitance.

One of the major psychoanalytic
terms now
ubiquitously used in many forms of
psychotherapy is resistance.
Resistance occupies a central
position in psychoanalytic theory and much of the
psychoanalytic technique
addresses the problem of analyzing
resistance.
Resistance
is a large and complex concept
which may be approached from
all six psychoanalytic points of
view (dynamic, topographic,
economic, structural, genetic, adaptive).
However, the
types of resistance are often classified
by their source

within the structural point of view (id,
ego. superego).
Freud first gave a detailed account of
resistance

in 1912

(1912/1958), then in 1914 (1914/1958), but the
structural

analysis doesn't come until 1926 in Inhibitions,
Symptoms
and Anxiety (1926/1959) with his final elaboration
in

Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937/1964) in
1937.
In Inhibitions,

Symptoms and Anxiety (1926/1959) Freud

developed five types of resistance:

repression resistance,

transference resistance, epinosic gain resistance, repetition compulsion resistance, and superego resistance.

The

first three derive from defensive functions of the ego, the

fourth from the id and the fifth from the superego.

Greenson (1967) believes all five types represent defensive

55

functions of the ego (conscious
and unconscious) and certainly this has been the trend
as seen in Fenichel

(1945),

Menninger (1958), and Blanck & Blanck
(1974).
Regardless'
of the source or the specifics
of its hypothesized mechanisms, mainstream psychoanalytic
theory sees resistance in
negative terms as a type of defense
(although Freud fre-

quently used resistance and defense
synonymously).
ance tends to be seen only as something

Resist-

to eradicate.

It

exists only to defend some aspect of
the ego when it is
feeling threatened.
Freud in his earlier two papers on
resistance used images of battle and warfare
to describe the
analyst's task in removing resistances.
Menninger 's (1958)

description of this attitudes still applies today:
In a way the analysis of each patient is
a kind of
never-ending duel between the analyst and the patient's
resistance.
It is no wonder that resistance almost
becomes personified for some analysts and that they
tend
to equate it with the disease process.
Resistance is
not something that crops up occasionally to 'impede'
the
course of treatment; it is omnipresent.
(p. 102)

This one-sided view of resistance phenomena as bad or
as a blockage (implied by the label "Resistance") frequently
is

inappropriately extended so that resistance is thought to

be directed at the analyst.

In practice,

it is often the

case that therapists self aggrandizingly think that they are

being opposed.

Wrongly sensing they are in a battle their

own defenses become aroused.

This counter- transference only

serves to widen the client- therapist gap and intensify the
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client's co^unication appearing
to the therapist as resistance phenomena.
The meaning of resistance,
no matter of what type,
is
in the best of definitions
limited to those forces which
resist therapeutic change within
the patient.
This is often
equated with resistance to making
the unconscious conscious,
a broadened version of repression
acting at various levels.

But those phenomena labeled resistance
in the negative

perspective are almost always seen as the
opposite of a
tendency for positive change.
This never helps to bring
client and therapist closer together
despite a professed
interest in promoting a working alliance.
When part of the
client is treated as bad, and often this is
seen as a major
part,

then to that extent he is demeaned, and
treated as

inferior.

It s a small step in the real world from
being
'

seen as bad and oppositional to being labeled
as willful,

uncooperative, lazy, unmotivated, and unready for therapy
or
untreatable.

The negative perspective in the concept of

resistance breeds this sort of devaluing and name calling
and limits the efforts of therapists to work at better

understanding the positive communication in resistance.
Resistance, while recognized as one of the key psycho-

analytic concepts, ironically means nothing more than that

which only exists by virtue of its anti-nature.

It is

assigned to a shadowy and changeable realm, a temporary
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force opposing other forces.

It has no vitality or
sub-

stance of its own though it may
be almost reified and
ossified as a sort of bodily
character armor (Reich, 1933/
1945)

Rather than helping to alert
the therapist to the
reasons that the self has adopted
a temporary refuge (for
example, maintaining a sense of
identity or autonomy or
mastery when threatened with its loss)
or even to the fact
that the self is revealing itself
as best it can, traditional resistance theory adds ever
more technical labels to
the forms of resistance.
The totality of the client is
missed as those operations developed over
years of the
.

self's struggle for survival and expression
are dismissed

with a quick interpretation based on the
categorized form
with which the phenomena are identified.
Schafer (1976),

leaving his early Freudian assumptions of drives
and counter
forces, surprisingly argues that there is a real,
positive

action behind the seeming negativity and anti-nature
of
resistance.
(p.

He calls for a more "balanced understanding"

263) which he hopes will be extended to the other major

psychoanalytic concepts as well

Transference

.

(p.

263).

Transference is certainly one of

Freud's essential discoveries for the understanding of human

behavior (the psychoanalytic establishment includes resistance,

the unconscious, and regression as the other major
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discoveries).

Freud's attention was first
drawn to the
concept of transference during his
early work with Charcot
and then in his own experiments
with and without the hypnotic technique (Menninger, 1958,
p. 79).
Freud was struck by
his repeated observation of the
exaggerated authority

attributed to the hypnotist.

In 1912,

in his papers on

technique, especially in The Dynamics of
Transference

(1912/1958), Freud was intrigued by the repetitive
patterns
of his patients and thereafter thought of
repetition as a

key element in transference.
Principle,

In 1920

(

Beyond the Pleasure

1920/1955) Freud posited repetition to be the

origin of transference.

Anna Freud (1937) defines transference as:

"all those

impulses experienced by the patient in his relation with
the

analyst which are not newly created by the objective analytic situation but have their source in early

.

.

.

object

relations and are now merely revived under the influence of
the repetition compulsion" (p. 18).

Fenichel (1945) equates

transference with resistance and Menninger (1958) sees it as
an aspect of regression.

All of these theories are somewhat

too narrow for it is much too arbitrary to limit transfer-

ence to therapy and it is certainly too restrictive to limit

transference to resistance or regression.

Greenson (1967)

defines transference much as does Anna Freud but he gives it
a broader and more useful scope:

"Transference occurs in

,
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analysis and outside of analysis, in
neurotics, psychotics
and in healthy people.
All human relations contain a
mixture of realistic and transference reactions"
(p.

152).

Transference, unlike resistance, is carefully
culti-

vated in analytic psychotherapy.

Its dual nature is much

more clearly recognized although still limited because
of
its place in the overall negative perspective.

1958)

Freud (1912/

first recognized and developed the dual nature of

transference and the repetition compulsion.

Transference on

the positive side gives access to unconscious, repressed ma-

terial much as does the dream.

It allows insight into early

object relations which otherwise, for the most part, are
inaccessible.

The established psychoanalytic view of the

negative aspect of transference is its association with
resistance.

It is felt that transference phenomena can also

be an obstacle to the work essentially by obscuring the

observing ego and replacing the working alliance.
Despite Freud's clear recognition and that of the

psychoanalytic community of the dual nature of transference,
the positive aspect of the duality is incomplete.

In fact,

the recognized positive aspect is important not for itself

but for the information it provides about the past.

The

communicative and object relational striving in the present,
the present hopefulness of the self for a new dialogic

experience, is missed.

Missed is the chance for a genuine
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encounter with the other.

The client is still objectified,

this time into an information
machine.

If the right keys

are pressed, out comes the early
traumas.

Never is the self

given credit for its fundamental,
intrinsic striving for
development and growth through its creative
use of the other
in transference phenomena.

The analyst/ therapist winds up

taking the credit for a fancy piece of
transference

interpretation which in the final analysis is rooted
in the
therapist's need to be clever, to maintain control,
to

remain the healer.
The Positive Perspective
It appals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in patients
by my personal need
to interpret.
If only we can wait the patient arrives
at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and I
now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the 'sense
of having been clever.
I think I interpret mainly to
let the patient know the limits of my understanding.
The principle is that it is the patient and only the
patient who has the answers. We may or may not enable
him or her to encompass what is known or become aware of
it with acceptance.
(Winnicott, 1971, pp. 86-87)
.

Delineation

.

.

The positive perspective is more than the lack

of a negative perspective.

It is the relatively missing

half of the full perspective needed to optimize the chance
for understanding the other and for working successfully in
a therapeutic modality.

positive perspective.

No one can fully grasp all of the
Its appearance always signifies an
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achievement.

It doesn't come easily.

it is forged in the

crucible of training, experience,
and work on oneself.
After these three ingredients
it takes, perhaps most
of all,
courage.
Courage isn't a popular word in
the psychotherapy
literature.
Nevertheless, it is an apt description
of that
quality required to achieve the
positive perspective for
several reasons.
Searles (1965, Chapters 10.
11. 13, and
15) frequently identifies the absolute
requirement
for

successful therapy being the ability of the
therapist to
allow regression to occur. And even more,
to allow oneself
to enter the regressive sphere.
This puts a great strain on
anyone's sense of self and requires considerable
fortitude.
The therapeutic situation in psychoanalysis,
as in

projective testing, has been defined as managing the
environment so as to allow regression to occur (Menninger',

1958,

Chapter III).

Freud's second fundamental rule--abstinence--

is directed toward this end (Freud,

166)

.

1915/1958c, pp. 165-

The positive perspective in psychotherapy requires

not just the technical establishment of an abstinent envi-

ronment but a venturing out into the regressive arena to

maintain the needed responsiveness of a "holding environment" (Winnicott, 1958/1975, 1971).

Excuses (rationales)

are sometimes given for a commonly held position that there
is some danger in a regression.

But as Winnicott asserts:
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"The danger does not lie in
the regression but in the
analysfs unreadiness to meet the
regression and the dependenc e
which belongs to it" (1958/1975,
p. 261).
There is a fear
of dependence, of merging, and
of sinking into a regressive
atmosphere.
The extent and intensity of this
fear is indicated by the lack of press it receives,
by the intensity of
the resistance to looking at it.
Rimbaud poetically captures the terrors attendant upon loss
of conscious supports
which besets anyone venturing into the
uncharted paths of

creativity or of the regressive experience:
As

I descended streams impassable
and dark,
felt my haulers vanished as so many ghosts
Redskins, shrieking, had used them for an arrow
mark
Nailing them, naked first, to many colored posts.
(Rimbaud, 1960, p. 5)

I

As mentioned previously, the negative perspective

always tends to remain dominant and in the majority as it
serves the function of a relatively successful defense

against madness.
personal level.

The chaos of madness is threatening at a

Glimpsing the failures of our familial-

social-economic system and the psychic consequences for the
poor of our usurption of the limited riches is threatening
at a societal level.

Breaking through our personal and

societal defenses is a courageous and radical act.
the risk of isolation and professional censure.
tion,

There is

By defini-

the positive perspective resists analysis, cloaks

itself in various disguises, must always be in a minority,
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always in the "background of
thought," dim and vague.
To
read the disguise and behind the
disguised coimnunication of
the symptom is to be a law breaker,
is to step out of the
status quo.
No one can do this for long.
The fifty minute
hour, like many of the trappings
of psychotherapy, are for
the protection of the therapist.
So attaining the positive perspective
takes courage in

struggling with regressive phenomena, in
risking proximity
to madness, and in inviting isolation
and censure when
breaking societal and professional mores. To
allow ourselves to see the positive perspective for awhile
is akin to
removing societal and psychological blinders.
Unfettered

seeing can be a radical act.

It takes courage to fight off

the unease precipitated by looking over the edge of
our

accustomed terrain.
edge of abysses:

of abysses?

"Courage also slays dizziness at the

and where does man not stand at the edge

Is not seeing always-seeing abysses"

(Neitzsche, 1954, p. 269)?

Achieving the positive perspective is not equivalent
to just accepting a client nor to passively just letting

things happen.
(Rogers,

1961).

It's not "unconditional positive regard"
It requires a questioning of basic assump-

tions about the nature of man.

One of the shortcuts to this

alternative way of seeing, a procedure that can be effected
in supervision and consulting activities to schools and half

64

way houses, for example, is by
stressing the value of dwelling on those assumptions which make
up the positive perspective.

The positive perspective assumes
that man is a social
and communicative animal always expressing
his innate stirrings for object related development.
Every psychological
symptom is a complex, well fused amalgam of
positive and
negative elements. Ths positive perspective, while
focusing
on the positive elements, comprehends both of
these.
While
it radically posits a hitherto unelaborated
positive striv-

ing it further asserts that the negative elements of
deficit

and deviance are also communicative expressions of the self.
The negative communication has been better recognized and

well developed by Freud and others as repetition, transference and resistance, essentially as seeing the past in
the present.

This basic psychoanalytic proposition, insofar

as it looks at symptomology as meaningful,

But,

is positive.

to the extent that it stresses the past to the exclu-

sion of the present, to the extent that it identifies the
self only with the deficit aspect of the symptom, to the

extent that it distances from engagement in dialogue with
the self in the s3miptom, it is negative.
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Psychoanalytic concepts

.

Rfli^tance.

The consequences of
the positive perspective are especially visible
in the psychoanalytic
concept of
resistance.
One of Freud's great
achievements which has
formed much of the bedrock of
psychoanalytic technique is
Freud's discovery of resistance.
Freud, and most of the

present day psychoanalytic conmunity,
aim their major
weapon, interpretation, at the
enemy of resistance. Freud
wrote in 1910:
superseded idea, and one derived from
iLitf^
superficial
appearances, that the patient suffers
from a
sort of Ignorance, and that if one
removes the ILorance
by giving hm information (about
the causal connl^^Ion
^ith his life, about his experiences
in
^i^^^^^
childhood,
and so on) he is bound to recover
The
ignorance in itself,
•"^^-'^
''^^
vioP""?
the root
of this ignorance in his inner resistances- but
it
^^ll^d this igiBce into being
"^^/^^^^
TnH
^h^^ still maintain it now.
and they
The task of the triatcombating these resitances.
(1910/1957, p.
,

225)

The positive perspective is diametrically
opposed to
this notion of resistance phenomena being "the
root" of

ignorance and of the overall assumption of resistance
being
located in the client.

It is far from remarkable that

clients don't give up their symptoms when the true facts are

recited to them.

What scientific hubris!

What remarkable

insensitivity to the aetiology of their problems.

What is

remarkable is the client's determined efforts to relate the
story of his bruised self and the persistance in the attempt

66

to establish a reciprocal
dialogue in spite of the failure

of the therapist to understand his
language.

The traditional Freudian techniques
of resistance
interpretation have undergone some modification
because of
the abject failure of this approach in
the psychotherapy of
children, adolescents, the more psychotic
adults, and those
less intellectualized.
Chapter III will pursue the thread
the positive perspective has taken as these
populations

demanded a different orientation.

For now, it is notable

that the negative perspective on resistance is still
pervasive and remains the major orientation being taught in

medical schools and in psychoanalytic institutes.

Graduate

training programs in clinical psychology are little better
for although most have stated their objection to the ex-

tended medical model they have little with which to replace
it.

The positive perspective offers the view that resist-

ance is mainly an artifact of that encounter wherein the

health provider has failed to achieve the positive perspective.

It is not a matter of a client failing to appreciate

an interpretation but of the failure of the therapist to

understand the present reality and communication of the
client.

"The patient is always right."

therapist,

to the environment

adapt to the client.

It's up to the

(Winnicott) to adequately

As Winnicott puts it,

".

.

,

it is the
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patient and only the patient who has the
answers" (1971.

p.

87).

Further, patience is required in dealing
with the

necessary time it takes for trust to be established,
for
sufficient testing to take place, and then for the
natural
developmental, repairative sequence to occur.

The delay in

the process of the unconscious becoming conscious is
not

attributable to the inertia
ciple,

(a

to the death instinct,

physicalist analogy) printo a contrary force acting

against reasonableness and our best efforts.

The perceived

"delay" is rather a product of our Western industrialized

need for quick solutions and rapid progress.
Much of what is called resistance is only the increased communicative efforts of a client to let us know
what the real state of affairs is with him when we persist
in supplying the answers or when we doggedly maintain dis-

tance and power.

This countertransf erential issue, our need

for power and effectance, along with the difficulty in

maintaining patience, are the most stubborn problem for
those learning the craft of psychotherapy.
is rooted in the

The difficulty

negative perspective wherein the motive

force for change is wrongly located within the therapist.
It takes getting back to some basic assumptions to re-

evaluate the change agent as the client himself.

It is

difficult for fledgling therapists, or even for the most

68

experienced, to first acknowledge and
then sustain the
perspective that therapy is nothing more
than providing a
facilitating, responsive, environment.
The therapist must
work at understanding, not at trying to make
change happen.

Transference.

The positive perspective was perhaps

most developed by Freud in his concept of the
repetition
compulsion and transference, terms he used interchangeably.
The positive value of transference as a form of communication will be developed in Chapter Til as the starting
point
of the positive perspective in psychoanalytic theory.

Freud's unfortunate loss of this radical position in his
1920 paper, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1955), left

psychoanalytic theory burdened with a concept which now
carried negative connotations.

As with resistance, Freud

came to associate the communicative richness of repetition

with the non-psychodynamic
inertia and Thanatos.

,

metabiological principle of

Despite this negative association,

Freud maintained that transf erential phenomena were of great
value (unlike resistance) in psychoanalytic therapy.
The positive perspective highlights the meaningfulness

Freud attributed to transference in revealing unconscious
aspects of the client's past.

But as with resistance, the

positive perspective would do more than merely use this

communication as data to be interpreted.

Transference is
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simply another astonishing,
creative activity of the self.
Unquestionably it provides information.
But it is also
something positive in itself.
In a way. it's the adult
version of play.
Freud, and especially Melanie Klein
(1932) and Anna

Freud (1964, 1974) discovered this
phenomenon that the play
of a child is not meaningless, not simply
a burning off of
excess energy.

Rather, in play a child creatively utilizes

his environment to master past traumas and to
exercise and

master his stage appropriate developmental tasks (Piaget,
1967)

.

The positive perspective sees the transf erential

activity of the adolescent and adult as another form of

repairative effort.

In transference the client seeks to use

the therapeutic environment in some needed way.

In general,

the need is to master past object relational conflicts and,

even more, to create these environmental provisions required
for the establishment of the necessary "holding environment"

(Winicott)

.

The self uses transference to artfully shape

the therapist and his environment so as to work through

false self adaptions and re- initiate the proper development
of the self.

Empathy

Empathy is the major tool of the positive

.

perspective, as opposed to interpretation (traditional

psychoanalysis)

,

manipulation (behavior modification)

,

or
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the paradoxical manipulations and
tag team interventions

(family therapy) now in vogue.

Kohut (1977, 1978) is one of

the ground-breakers in postulating
the radical notion that

introspection and empathy alone are the major
psychoanalytic
tools of both research and therapy.
Despite the passage of
eighty years since Freud first started using
introspection
and empathy, these unique abilities remain largely
devalued

within Western culture.

Kohut 's efforts are directed at

establishing the validity of these tools and the consequent
and equally radical notion of the reality of the interior,

psychic world.

Addressing the assumptions of the positive perspective
can help facilitate empathy.

This is done by establishing

the continuity of client-therapist and viewing the deviancy

of the client as understandable, communicative, and only

quantitatively different from ourselves.

By minimizing the

distance between the two partners participating in the
dialogue of change, empathy is encouraged.

The negative

perspective would merely look to theory and think of resistance when it is felt that the working alliance is disintegrating.

The positive perspective would encourage intro-

spection on the part of the therapist to look for blockages
in one's empathy.

Further, since the client is always

right, working alliance difficulties should serve as an

71

incentive to the therapist for
increased attention to the
overall communication by the
client.

Empathy can be developed not only
by training and
experience but also by continued
review of the positive and
negative perspective assumptions.
All psychotherapy
trainees, as well as teachers and
others with a need for
mental health understanding, come to
their tasks with many
implicit assumptions based on the negative
perspective.
Consequently, their empathy is curtailed.
They often wind
up in oppositional power struggles with
their charges

because of their limited empathy.

Empathy is a useful,

practical concept not just in psychotherapy but
throughout
the mental health field.

The positive perspective can be

instrumental in allowing greater use of empathy in a
variety
of settings to the benefit of everyone.

CHAPTER

III

DEVELOPMENT AND VICISSITUDES OF
THE
POSITIVE PERSPECTIVE
A^^^^^world todefinite trend on the part of the Iav
and medical
consider themselves as separate
'°
supe?iEr by
"""^^^^^
vIrturof't£?"'°"
virtue
of this assumed, unproven,
but generally accepted
state of being normal.
Consequently,
xnsane, regardless of our scientific ?he so-cllled
theories are at a
disadvantage
relation to the very world upon which
they have become so dependent as a
result of their
considers them stepchUdren o^'T^^f °^P^^i^^
Perhaps it is this psychological
f.ni^l
u'u
t^'^
factor which has been more responsible than
any other
for the sad lot of the mentally ill
throughout the ages
Perhaps it is this factor, rather than thi
and theological errors of the Sprengers and philosophical
the
Kraemers which throughout the demonological
centuries
brought down upon the mentally sick the full weight
of
human cruelty.
Perhaps this psychological factor has
survived
the human community as an atavistic but
potent inheritance from those remote days when
primitive
peoples summarily killed the sick and the aged merely
because they had become burdens to a community which
refused to be discommoded by the dead weight of the
inept.
(Zilboorg. 1941/1967, p. 312)

^

•

m

m

Freud
Up to now, perhaps the passage of the negative per-

spective from Freud up through the present has been overstressed.

It is unfair to attribute to Freud the present

difficulties we have in struggling with the pervasive influence of elements of the negative perspective.

Freud's

great stature as the most influential psychological theorist
can hardly be held against him.
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Like all of us, he is
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partly the product of all the historical
forces of his t:lime
That aspects of the negative
perspective, which by definition tend to oppose conscious thought,
found their way into
his theorizing is not unusual.
What is remarkable is the
extent to which he made these unconscious
elements conscious
and the extent to which he achieved the
positive perspective.

Although elements of the positive perspective on
psychological theory were in evidence long before Freud,

it

took Freud's genius and courage to begin to assemble
them in
a coherent point of view.

As

I

have discussed, there is

great difficulty today in "seeing" psychological symptom-

ology from a more positive perspective.

Freud's accomplish-

ments are all the more remarkable given that his positive

perspective achievements began eighty-six years ago and were
carried out almost single handedly against great resistance

from his medical profession and from society in general.

In

pursuing the meaning of all human thought and behavior, in
trying to understand man in his totality, Freud greatly

extended the meaning and scope of symptomology

.

Prior to

Freud, S3nnptoms had mainly been viewed only as a sign of an

underlying pathology, as something to eradicate.

Freud

amplified the notion of symptoms from discrete, tell-tale
signs of pathology into the more continuous revelation of
the person's life history.

It is this

very broad notion of
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symptomology, not the specific
symptoms o£ a diagnosti c
category, that will be pursued.
The interaction of Freud' s
bold new attitude toward symptomology
with his radical
method of listening rapidly led
to meta-theoretical breakthroughs.
With Freud, the positive perspective
took a
quantum leap forward until Freud lost
much of his radical
nerve
'

"

Among Freud's significant positive
perspective
achievements, perhaps the greatest was the
degree to which
he took "normal man" out of his separate,
ego-centric place
in the world.

To this extent, Freud is on a par with

Copernicus and Darwin.

It is not just that Freud challenged

mankind's haughtiness in his exclusive identification
with
rationality and his denial of a bestial unconscious,
al-

though this would certainly in itself testify to his
courage
and radical insight.

Even more, Freud defied the sacrosanct

elevation and separation of one man from another, of the
"normal" man from the "madman," of asymptomatic man from

symptomatic man.

As Foucault (1954/1976, 1961/1973) so beau-

tifully elucidates, it has been considered "progress" that

madmen have gradually been separated in houses of confinement and in our thinking from society in general as well as
from criminals, malingerers, and debtors.

Freud had the

audacity to oppose this "progress" by theoretically putting

madness and symptomology back into antisepticised society.

,
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This achievement by Freud is especially
noteworthy as
he also had to question the elevated
position and separateness of the doctor, of society's representative
in keeping
madness at bay. Through daily introspection
Freud labored
on lessening his personal separation from madness;
through

therapeutic activity (first hypnotism and suggestion
with
Charcot and then free association coupled with empathy)
he,
for the first time in western psychological history

(Zilboorg, 1941/1967), cut through the scientific-medical-

professional detachment from madness.

This was a first for

the psychological use of directed therapeutic effort serving
as a research Ti^sthod as well and a first for putting all

normality on a continuum with madness.

All the rest of

Freud's positive perspective achievements derive from this.
The positive perspective in Freud thus began with his

earliest psychoanalytic work, On the Psychical Mechanism of

Hysterical Phenomena:
Freud, 1893/1955)

.

Preliminary Communication (Breuer

6c

Here Freud broke with the medical

tradition and looked for the meaning and causality of

hysterical symptomology not in the physical world (Charcot)
not in the mere forms of the ideational world (Kraeplin)
but in the specific content of the mental world.

Eschewing

three of Charcot's four descriptive, physicalist phases of

hysteria (the epileptoid phase, the phase of large movements, the phase of terminal delirium), Freud says:

"Our

,

:

.
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attempted explanation (of hysteria)
takes its start from the
third of these phases, that of the
'attitudes passionnelles'" (p. 14). This is the hallucinatory
phase.
Freud
continues
^ well-marked form, it exhibits
the hallucinatory reproduction of a memory
which was of
importance
bringing about the onset of hysteria--the
memory either of a single major trauma (which we
find
£ar excellence in what is called traumatic
hysteria) or
a series of interconnected part-traumas
(such as underlie common hysteria).
Or. lastly, the attack may revive
the events which have become emphasized owing to
their
coinciding with a moment of special disposition to
trauma (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1955, pp. 13-14)

m

Freud was taking the internal world and its symptomatic expression seriously.

He was also understanding that

this world had meaning (his determinacy assumption) and even

more,

that the apparent madness of hallucination "repro-

duced," communicated memories of real past events (traumas).
The qualitative gap between madness and sanity was closing
and the special sort of seeing-listening this demanded

contained the seeds of empathy.

Further, Freud was using a

therapeutic technique ("the cathartic method" in hypnosis)
not just for therapy but as a tool for advancing theoretical

understanding
Two years later,

in 1895,

Freud opened the doors to a

fuller development of the positive perspective by modifying
his technique.

In The Psychotherapy of Hysteria (1895/1955)

Freud had broken with Breuer and established the technique

.

.
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of free association.

Advances in technique, like
Descartes'
construction of calculus, not only
solve old problems but
open new worlds.
Freud was no longer manipulating
or acting
on his patients with a technique
reminiscent of the operation of a machine.
No longer was hypnosis "being
applied."
The need for effectance and control
persisted in his interpretative technique but now he was
just listening.
Symptoms
weren't just isolated phenomena to be
eradicated but were
coming to be seen as an irreducible
part of the person's
life history as narrated in free association.
This technique could be applied to everyone, as well
as to oneself.

Empathy and introspection were becoming the
therapeutic and
research tools of the trade, though it took fifty
years for
them to be fully appreciated in Winnicott and Kohut
Freud had begun to take the whole person into consi-

deration by attentively listening to the story of his'
patient's life and to the contextual meaning of his symptoms
In 1900 Freud (1900/1953) added dreams to the significant

activity of man and in 1905 (1905/1960) he added humor.
Dreams and humor, like the symptoms of hysteria, were meaningful.

Pathological conditions and the seemingly trivial

activity of dreams, jokes, and even a child's play could
communicate to him who valued the meaningfulness and present

reality of another.
could take many forms

The symptomatic expression of the self
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The significance of repetition
symptomology

,

of the

repetition compulsion, was perhaps
first observed in Breuer
6c Freud's work,
Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Conn.nn.-cation (1893/1955).
Freud there spoke of
the hallucinatory reproduction of a memory.
(p. 14),
.

.

.

.

Xn

dreams. Freud then saw repetition symptomology
in the dream
work's replaying events of the past with the
implication of
an inner striving for mastery (1900/1953), a
suggestion he

then picked up in children's play and in the exercise
of

joking (1905/1960).

However Freud soon was taken with the

importance of resistance and repetition came to assume a

mostly negative nature.
Repetition became mainly that activity which will be
endlessly reproduced in acts if it is not abreacted and

brought into awareness (1914/1958)

.

At this stage trans-

ference is also seen in a more negative light, a source of

resistance (1912/1958).

The positive perspective is in

danger of eclipse as Freud's narcissism blinds him to seeing
that "the patient is always right," blinds him to seeing the

positive meaning of symptomology.

Images of warfare pre-

dominate in his work at this time for Freud wants to assert
the correctness of his interpretations while the patient

demands acceptance of his own way of testing and developing.

Typically Freud says, "He (the therapist) is prepared for a
perpetual struggle

.

.

."

(1914/1958, p. 153).
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Aspects of both the positive and negative
perspectives
on symptomology and on the therapist's attitude
and methods
are interwoven in Freud's ambivalence at this time.
On the

relatively positive side Freud says, for example,

".

.

.we

must treat his illness, not as an event of the past, but as
a present-day force" (1914/1958, p. 151), and "we admit it

(repetition compulsion) into the transference as a play-

ground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete
freedom.

..."

(p.

154).

completing the last quote,

On the negative side Freud says,

"...

and in which it is ex-

pected to display to us everything in the

\<ray

of pathogenic

instincts that is hidden in the patient's mind"

(p.

154).

Freud continually warns of the dangers in repetition, both
to the patient and to therapy.

In the balance,

Freud is

leaning towards the negative perspective with clear emphasis
on fighting resistance as opposed to "seeing" and aligning

with the positive forces for change within the patient's
s3nnptomatic communication through repetition and trans-

ference.

One year later, in 1915, Freud dramatically regains
some of that perspective on the total person he lost while

embattled with resistance phenomena.

Repetition symptomol-

ogy can once again be seen in a more balanced way with its

positive aspects recognized as an important ally in the
process of therapeutic change.

The inherent striving of the

:
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self toward object related health
even in the most "pathological" conditions gets its clearest
expression in all of

Freudian thought.

In The Unconscious (1915/1957d)

,

in his

attempted explanation of the remarkable
existence of dreamlike "word-presentations" in the waking
thought of
schizo-

phrenics, Freud asserts:
It turns out that the cathexis of the
word-presentation
IS not part of the act of repression, but
represents the
tirst of the attempts at recovery or cure which
so

conspicuously dominate the clinical picture of schizophrenia.
These endeavors are directed toward reeainine
the lost object
(pp. 203-204)
.

.

.

Freud picks up this same theme in A Metapsychological
Supplement to the Theory of Dreams (1915/1957b) and extends
it to include even the most bizarre "word-presentations" in

the schizophrenic's hallucinatory symptomology

The hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia has been
thoroughly studied; it seems as a rule to be of a
composite nature, but in its essence it might well
correspond to a fresh attempt at restitution, designed
to restore a libidinal cathexis to the ideas of obiects
(p. 230).

At this point, Freud's individual achievement of the positive perspective is remarkable.

He has brought almost all

aspects of human activity and symptomology (dreams, play,

psychotic thought and hallucinations, neurotic compulsions
to repeat,

especially as seen in the transference, and the

mechanisms of regression, projection, condensation, displacement) into a cohesive, positive perspective.

There is

no form of human thought or behavior which can be considered
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foreign or separate or
qualitatively different. Even
more
the very symptomatic expression
of "pathology" or deviancy
can now, quite astonishingly,
be seen as having in its
content an understandable striving
towards "cure" or
"health."

An ominous shadow falls on all
this positive development in, fittingly, A Case of Paranoia
Running Counter to
the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the DisP.p...P
(1915/1957a)

.

While still strongly acknowledging the
importance and
reality of the inherent psychical tendency
towards

"cure,"

as expressed in symptomology

by

C.

G.

,

Freud's attention is captured

Jung's notion of inertia.

'^}}^^^^acts throw light on a statement by C. G. June
to
the effect that a peculiar 'psychical inertia,'
which
opposes change and progress, is the fundamental preconditionof neurosis. This inertia is indeed most peculiar; It is not a general one, but is highly specialized; it is not even all-powerful within its own field,
but fights against tendencies towards progress and
recovery which remain active even after the formation of
neurotic symptoms. (1915/1957a, p. 272)

Up to now, Freud had come to see the dual nature of

repetition compulsion symptomology as expressive of both an
indication of pathology as well as a striving for "progress
and recovery."

But now, as in 1914 when resistance was

viewed as opposition situated within the patient, the

negative denotations of repetition gain the ascendency.
Freud had a brief flirtation with an object relational base
for the positive, repetitive principle in The Unconscious
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(1915/1957d) but now he finally consolidates
all psychical
symptomology in an instinctual base.
In The

'Uncanny'

(1919/1955) instinct has clearly

replaced the object seeking nature of the
self, repetition
has only a negative character and takes
on
a strange,

eerie,

threatening quality:
For it is possible to recognize the dominance
in the
unconscious mmd of a 'compulsion to repeat'
proceeding
from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent
in
the very nature of the instincts--a compulsion
powerful
enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to
certain aspects of the mind their daemonic character
and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of
small children; a compulsion, too, which is responsible
for a part of the course taken by the analyses of
neurotic patients. All these considerations prepare us
for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner
^compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny.
(p.
'

Freud had come the closest to articulating and achieving the positive perspective in The Unconscious (1957d) in
1915.

It appears he was quickly losing his radical nerve,

his courage was failing, and he was retreating to ever more

abstractionistic

,

devitalized principles.

The final blow

for some of the most essential, comprehensive aspects of the

positive perspective came the following year.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1955) Freud

attempted to systematize some of his basic metaphysical
assumptions (not his metapsychological points of view)

.

The

adequacy of the derivative Reality Principle to oppose the
all powerful, instinctual core of the Pleasure Principle had
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been questioned for years.

Freud needed an equally strong

and self-energized force to
achieve a reasonable balance.
He found the answer in the
repetition compulsion. Freud's
logic becomes awkward and forced
as his need for a rigid
dualistic scheme of opposing forces
thrusts the repetition

compulsion and the Pleasure Principle
into unnatural opposition.

Freud first loosely associates psychical
repetition
with the meta-biological notion of ontogony
recapitulating
phylogony.
Even the principle of the stability in
genetic
inheritance from one generation to another is linked

to the

principle of repetition.

The logic becomes more abstract

and stilted as Freud associates the repetition compulsion

with a fundamental property of stasis and conservation in
the physical and psychological worlds.

The next step is to

the Death Instinct, a force capable of opposing the activity

and life of the Pleasure Principle.

There is irony in the metamorphosis of a principle

which once was afforded the elevated, positive status of
expressing man's inherent, unceasing, object relational
striving towards mastery, "progress" and health, as ex-

pressed in concrete symptomology into an abstract principle
of inertia and death.

Resistance phenomena, regression,

transference, dreams, play, and all symptomology were now

tarred with the brush of negativity.

As Freud himself says:
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in:t>ts'oi s^ff-pre^er^^t^Sr^Sf importance
Ihl^^

I

.

of the

whose function it is to assure that
the organism

^^turning to inorganic existence other
^
?han
than tin
those which
are inmiinent in the
We have no longer to reckon with the organism itself
organism's puzziins
determination (so hard to fit into any context) ^^^^^'-'^S
maintain its own existence in the face of
every obstacle.
(1920/1955, p. 39)

^

After 1920 Freud does try to pick up the more
human
part of us. He places our selfhood in the ego
and
super

ego,

especially in the super ego.

But these are lifeless

constructs, mechanical, secondary and derivative without

substance or energy in themselves.

Instincts remain at the

heart of us, Eros and Thanatos, impersonally and perpetually
at war.

Much of the psychoanalytic and clinical psychologi-

cal establishment, along with lay society in general,

remains caught, mostly unawares, in the resultant negative
perspective.

Symptoms can only be seen in a negative light.

This resultant negative perspective on symptomology has

significant and long lasting consequences for the theory of
change and for the psychotherapeutic process.
Once Freud removed the vitality, the communicative

striving and the impetus in all repetition symptomology

toward restoration and health, the patient/client was left

with no inner motivation for cure.

Once change had been

attributed to the natural tendency in the client to grow and
develop, now the power for change can only be firmly located
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in the therapist.

It is now up to the therapist
to make

change happen, to intervene and manipulate
and interpret.
When resistance phenomena occur it is
only the

fault of the

patient, of his basic inertia or Death
Instinct.

The

therapist is off the hook.
Freud had the courage and perseverence to articulate

more of the positive perspective than anyone previously.

He

left a mixed legacy, but there were others to cultivate
the
seeds he first planted.

Post-Freudians

Early Schizmatics--C
W.

.

G.

Jung and W. Reich

.

C.

G.

Jung and

Reich were important spokesmen for some selected aspects

of the positive perspective.

However, both were relative

deadends in the overall development of the positive per-

Neither had a major impact on the established

spective.

theory or practice of psychotherapy.

Jung and Reich have

always retained an intense and cult- like following, but
their ardent supporters have remained in the minority.

As

theorists accepted by the establishment came to give voice
to more of the positive perspective, and with the impact of

Eastern culture and religions, these early Schizmatics have
found greater acceptance.
C.

G

.

Jung

.

It is well known that Jung broke with

Freud partly on account of Jung's feeling that Freud
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over-stressed man's sexual and
secular nature and so despite
his professed intent wound up
treating symptoms in their
superficial meaning rather than
taking the whole person into
account.
Jung brought man's spiritual
and religious nature
into the therapy room.
Jung, by virtue of his extensive
work with psychotics, and given his
adoption of
Freud's

positive perspective notion of the
meaningfulness of all
human thought, tried to find the meaning
of psychotic
thinking.

Jung found associations between the highly

symbolic (Freudian "word presentations") mode
of religious

expression in primitive and modem culture with the
verbal
and artistic productions (symptomology) of psychotics.

Thus

Jung,

like Freud, put psychotic thinking (but also religous

symbology) on a continuum with "normal thought" and helped

close the gap separating creativity from madness from sanity
from spiritual experience.
In his notions of archetypes and the collective

unconscious, Jung came to a sort of teleological thinking.
To E. Kant's a priori categories of understanding he added
a kind of inherited memory with his concept of the collec-

tive unconscious.

The collective unconscious is made up of

archetypes which Jung defines as "unconscious regulators"
(1960,

energy"

p.

204).

".

indifferent

.

can be healing or destructive, but never

.

.

These unconscious regulators of "psychic

.

."

(1960, p.

205).

Jung thus hypothesized
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that there was a potentially
healing force in all of us if
one's psychic energy could be
property channelled.
The
consequences for therapy were that
the patient himself had
the answers to his problems, the
curative agent was in the
patient, not the therapist, and the
motive force for change
came directly from the patient's unconscious.
Patients'
dreams, artistic productions, and free
associations all had
a positive, communicative nature.

W,_Reich.

Wilhelm Reich's major break with Freud came
in 1920 after Freud's publication of Beyond the
Pleasure
Principle (1920/1955).

Reich felt that Freud had shied away

from Freud's original theoretical basis for all psychological phenomena:

sexual energy.

Like Jung, Reich focused on

the formative influence of the libido.

none of Jung's (or Freud's) abstractness

But Reich would have
.

Jung and Freud

and the rest of the psychoanalytic community were essen-

tially accused of being too fearful of sex and aggression,
of "acting out" counter-transf erential material.

"At issue

was the concrete releasing of aggression and sexuality in
the patient.

At issue was the personal structure of the

therapist who had to deal with and handle this aggression
and sexuality" (1942/1973, p. 121).
Reich's goal was to bring "man the animal" back into
therapy.

In this regard he also emphasized the positive

perspective notion of accepting and engaging the whole
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person.

content

He emphasized that after
1920 "form eclipsed

..."

(1942/197'^
kJ-^^z/iy/j,
n
p.

i9q\
125).

u
He

especially felt that

the theory of the death instinct
represented

"...

disintegration within the psychoanalytic
movement
(1942/1973, p. 125).
Further,

.

signs of
.

."

The exponents of the death instinct,
who appeared in
greater and greater numbers and with
increasing digSity
^'
because now they could speak of 'Thantos'
instLd of
^""^^^^
neurotic self-injurious intend of
the sick psychic organism to a primary
biological
instinct of the living substance.
Psychoanalysis never
recovered from this.
(1942/1973, p. 128)

Reich wanted to bring the psychoanalytic patient
back
to life.

He tried to restore the "rightness" of the pa-

tient's communication by stressing the unpopular issue
of

countertransference.

He asserted that the so called "nega-

tive therapeutic reaction" was the therapist's fault, not
the fault of the patient's Thanatos.

Therapists are afraid

not only of sex and aggression, but also of "pleasure anxiety."

As for ego psychology, he said, "The atmosphere was

becoming 'purified'" (1942/1973,

p.

124).

However, Reich's

theory itself became purified and abstract as he

went from sex to universal orgone energy and he also re-

mained rooted in a physicalist, non psychodynamic orientation
Early object relations and play therapy

.

Melanie Klein,

Anna Freud and Heinz Hartmann stand out as significant
contributors to the positive perspective.

Anna Freud and

.
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Melanie Klein, in particular,
have been a seminal fore,:e
the development of the positive
perspective.
Jung had to
modify psychoanalytic technique
and learn the language of
symbols and artistic creating because
of his work with a new
population, with the symptomology of
psychotics.
S. Freud
had modified his hypnotic technique to
work with those who
couldn't easily be hypnotized and so opened
up an entirely

m

new view of man.

Anna Freud and Melanie Klein also had the

courage to extend psychoanalytic therapy to an
entirely new
population, to children.
(Freud tried once, failed,
and

decided that unless the father were the therapist it
would
be impossible to enlist the support of the child in any
of
the psychoanalytic procedure, especially in following the

basic rule--uncensored free association)

Melanie Klein

.

Melanie Klein was the intrepid innova-

tor who first started the psychoanalytic therapy of children
in 1919.

She devised a new technique, play therapy, and

followed and interpreted the free associations of children
as acted out in play.

Klein understood that children com-

municate S3m[ibolically in play.

Her technique allowed her to

work with children as young as two years old and even with
them she utilized direct interpretation.

Klein believed it

was important to establish direct contact with the patient's

unconscious anxiety and fantasy (Segal, 1967).

She believed

in by-passing the more cautious and circuitous route
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established by Freud of interpreting
defenses and resistance.
In a way. this was a
positive perspective technique
in that she hoped to engage
the deepest and "realesf

parts
However, these interpretations
were made with
little regard for the history of
the defenses, were forced
on patients, and implied that the
curative power of therapy
was situated in the interpretative
ability of the therapist.
Melanie Klein pushed back the frontiers
of theory to
the months of earliest infancy.
Perhaps her greatest

of the self.

contribution, besides the play therapy technique
which
allowed communication with children, was her
development of
the very early stirrings of object relations.
"I have often
expressed the view that object-relations exist from the

begining of life

.

.

(1975, p. 2).

Klein's theory of

very early development was based on the mechanisms of
introjection and projection.

Her thoughts on the two stages

of the oral period, the paranoid-persecutory-schizoid and
the depressive position were tied to an object relational

vocabulary of whole objects (a person) or part objects
(e.g., a breast).

This had great influence on the rest of

British School theory, especially Fairbaim, Winnicott, and
Gun trip.
As great as these contributions were to a positive

perspective, object relational, self psychology, Klein's

thinking was imbued with much of the negative perspective.
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While she used an object relational
vocabulary and took the
reality of the internal world very
seriously, she tended to
ignore the social and familial
forces of the external world.
Further, it was always very clear
that behind the object
relational, descriptive forms of the
oral stage
the real

energic system was instinctual, not
object relational:
I hold that anxiety arises
from the
of the
death instinct within the organism, operation
is felt as fear of
annihilation (death) and takes the form of
fear of
^^^^
destructive
impulse
?f
i^"^;
to attach
Itself at once to an object-or rather itseems
is
experienced as the fear of an uncontrollable
overpowert^i^power
ing object.
(Klein, 1975, p. 4)

Anna Freud.
therapy.

In 1926 Anna Freud modified Klein's play

Anna Freud brought a new respect for the child to

psychoanalytic theory and technique.

Although perhaps best

known for her elucidation of defenses which she developed in
her work with children (they apply to adults just as well),
it was her humanizing of the play therapeutic relationship

which gives her a lasting place in the positive perspective.
Anna Freud eschewed direct and forced interpretations
and stressed respecting the defenses of the child and the

need to elicit trust and to build a working relationship.
She maintained that the child was a person and contact had
to be made with the quizzical,

unconscious anxiety.

timorous self, not with

Unfortunately Anna Freud used a

desicate, lifeless, structural ego psychology theory.

But

this didn't obscure her sensitivity to the person of the
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child.

Further, she was much
more
i^i-ti attuned
auEuned to
^n the
^t,
external
reality of children, to
their plight
pj-ignt as victims
V1V^•
of insiduous
social and familial
ai torces,
.
forcpc,
as seen
her collaboration in
Beyon d the Best Interes^.
of the uniid
.
^d£__Lne
Child (r^iA
(Goldstein,
Freud &
Solnit, 1973).

m
•

,

~

^^^^^^-^-I^I^^

•

In Chapter

1. the relationship of the adaptive viewpoint
in psychoanalytic metapsychology with the implications
of adaptive processes in
the
positive perspective was briefly
discussed.
It was said
that adaptation has relatively
little to do with the positive perspective on symptomology
although there are similarities.
The extent of overlap depends on
how broadly we
define the metapsychological concept
of adaptation.
Certainly the psychoanalytic concept of
adaptation mainly devel
,

oped by Erikson (1950, 1968) and Hartmann
(1939/1958) has
been helpful in advancing the positive
perspective.
The position of this thesis is that the positive
perspective is a

super-ordinate meta-theoretical assumption.

The six metapsy

chological viewpoints partake to a greater or lesser
degree
in the assumptions of the positive and negative
perspectives

Greenson (1967) states the adaptive point of view
comprehends "all propositions concerning the relationship
to
the environment (of) objects of love and hate, relations
to

society,

etc."

(p.

25).

This definition excludes nothing.

.
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Rappaport and Gill (1959) give
a much fuller, detailed,
bounded account. As a general
statement it can safely be
said that the adaptation viewpoint
is based on biological
principles first and only secondarily
are these related to
psychosocial processes. Even when we
are out of the realm
of biology altogether the
psychosocial processes are based
on biological and physicalist analogies
and metaphors.

The

adaptive viewpoint never achieves a purely
psychodynamic
object relational core.
Never is the communicative aspect
of symptomology or the striving for more than
adaptation,

for mastery and "curative" development, ever
broached.

This general critique of the psychoanalytic metapsycho logical adaptive viewpoint applies to Hartmann's
use of

adaptation as well.

However, in Ego Psychology and the

Problem of Adaptation (1939/1958) Hartmann makes explicit,
and develops much more fully, Freud's implicit notions of

adaptation which have some import for the positive perspective.
".

.

Hartmann's argument begins with the hypothesis that
.

certain forms of conflict solution (defenses) may

involve biological guarantees of an adaptation process to

external reality" (1939/1958, p. 14).

Hartmann then extends

those adaptive processes to fantasy which
to dream work

life"

(p.

18)

.

.

.

".

.

.in contrast

attempts to solve problems in waking

Adaptive processes may effect changes to the

external environment (alloplastic)

,

or to the internal

.
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environment (autoplastic)
,

or may even proceed by
changing

environments

Although Hartmann remains tied
to a biologically based
ego psychology, he has been
able to look favorably at his
fellow humans.
Basically he attributes a
positive meaning
to their actions, even to
fantasies.
He posits
a self-

motivated, self-energized force or
structure within all of
us.
No matter what our label within
DSM-III we all share
the same impetus towards getting along
with and mastering
,

the inner and outer worlds.

Later object relations and self psychology

.

The work of

Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Gun trip, British school,
object

relations therapists and theorists, had a common
development
They were contemporaries and although each was an
independent and innovative thinker their theories grew out
of one
major, psychoanalytic branch.

This was the positive per-

spective, object relational sequence started with Freud and

greatly amplified by Melanie Klein., Klein had legitimized
the object relational waff lings in Freud by rooting her

theory in an object relational view of the neonate's mental
structuring.

This represented a major challenge to Freud's

other base, the biological, and constituted "the real turning point in psychoanalytical theory and therapy within the

Freudian movement itself" (Guntrip, 1971,

p.

47).
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Klein provided credibility to
the realness of the
internal world, Sullivan provided
acceptance for the use of
the term "self" with his "self-system"
and "self -dynamism"
(Sullivan, 1953, 1974), Balint
(1968) began the notion of
the formative significance of an early,
object relational,

"basic fault" (Balint. 1968), and Fairbaim
synthesized all
of this.

Fairbaim. Winnicott, Guntrip

Fairbaim was the

.

first to truly achieve and maintain the view that
object

relations were the crucial, determining factor in the outcome of the personality.

Even Guntrip. a theoretical rival

of sorts, concedes this (Guntrip. 1971. p. 101).

Adding the

refinements and the special areas of development which

Winnicott and Guntrip pursued, there was now, for the first
time, at least in some isolated spots in the British Isles,

a psychology of the person.

Fairbaim himself states that

".

.

it would appear as

if the point had now been reached at which, in the interests

of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be

transformed into a theory of development based essentially

upon object-relationships " (1952,

p.

31).

Man isn't just a

chunk of floatsam pushed this way and that by dark, interior, animal forces.

Rather, both the formative influence of

the external social world of man and the reality of the

internal social world of man is recognized, a radically
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major event.

Fairbaim also recognizes
the positive aspects

of regressive and other
seexningly pathological
sympto.ology
and puts this in an object
relational context.
D.

Winnicott, while far less of
a systematizer than
Fairbairn, allowed his in^nersion
in daily pediatric practice
with children to inform and
concretize the more speculative
and abstract theory of Fairbairn.
All of the positive
perspective pioneers utilized the radical
human
W.

tool of

empathy, but Winnicott achieved the
ability to utilize it
best of all.
Winnicott 's writings demonstrate his
closeness
to, and dialogue with the psychic
reality of another.

Winnicott created the major concepts of "the
holding
environment," of the "facilitating environment,"
and of

"good enough mothering."

These concepts, together with his

consistent compositional attempts to convey the social

reality of the inner world, give him a unique place in the
achievement of the positive perspective.

In addition,

Winnicott extended and personalized Balint's notion of the
basic fault in what Winnicott called the false self.

Kahn

pithily summarizes the false self concept of Winnicott:
"The false self has as its main concern a search for condi-

tions which will make it possible for the true self to come
into its own" (1969, p. 393).

Winnicott

's

additions to the positive perspective,

such as the concept of hope in the anti-social tendency, of

:

:

.
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creativity, and his notions
ur nlav
of
^
a
piay, are found
almost
every page of his writings.
All of this is of great
practical significance for the
practice of mental health delivery

m
-

(Friedman, 1975).

To read Winnicott is to
risk having one's

attitude permanently changed.

This applies both in a theore-

tical reorientation to a new
empathic understanding of man's
striving to do the best he can in a
difficult world as well
as to an altered perspective on our
professional therapeutic
efforts

psychotherapy is done in the overla of the
p
two
^'"^ patient and that^f t^^TT^ ^^^^^f-^?f^
^^''^L
If the therapist cannot play, then he
is not
,
suitable for the work.
If the patient cannot play then
something needs to be done to enable the patient
to
become able to play, after which therapy may begin
The
reason why playing is essential is that it is in playing
that the patient is being creative (1971,
p. 54).
•

•

Winicott continues
It is in playing and only in playing that the
individual
child or adult is able to be creative and to use the
whole personality, and it is only in being creative that
the individual discovers the self.
(1971, p. 54)

Harry Guntrip helped to bring Winnicott 's and
Fairbairn's work out of Britain, popularize it, sxjmmarize
it,

and put it in historical perspective.

increasing use of Winnicott
sis with him (Sutherland,

's

Guntrip made

work after a period of analy-

1980, p.

849).

Guntrip especially

emphasized the positive nature of his extended view of
defense,

including splits in the self, the use of manic-

depressive states, and the defensive use of object relations

:

.
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in the internal world.

Guntrip's work has served as a

valuable link to Kohut
Heinz Kohut

.

Winnicott had the ability to sustain
empathic

immersion in shared psychic reality.

However, his use of

this achievement remained at an implicit level.

Heinz Kohut

openly acknowledged the importance of these
remarkable

positive perspective abilities in man.

Western man's stress

on external reality, on a positivistic and physicalist

obsession with external facts, has made the internal world
generally thought of as unreal.

Freud and the rest of the

positive perspective theorists have had the courage to

challenge this unbalanced perspective but the scientific
community remains skeptical.
Heinz Kohut (1978) has brought the issue to a head in

openly declaring not just the utility, but the necessity in

using introspection and empathy as the basic tools of
psychotherapy.

Kohut has explicated the concepts, systema-

tized them within his self psychology theory, and has used
his elevated status within the Chicago psychoanalytic

community to legitimize them.

Kohut has helped to further

the positive perspective's legitimization of the technique

giving access to the internal world, of our ability to

achieve this technique, and of the internal world.
writes

Kohut
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fantasies faSnot
seen 'sm^illd'^'h:' ^^^^^"g^'
touched,
They have no existence
nhvi^
i
^"'^
^^^^
are real, and we cin observe^?he^\'P?£^'

Kohut, as legitimizer, has helped
establish the
reality in America of the notion of
the self (1977)
This
has marked the end of the exclusive
domain of the ego in
.

American psychological thought.

Freud's retreat in the

1920s to the structuralist position has
finally been

challenged in this country.

With it, Kohut brings a new

personalness and vitality especially with his stress
on the
value of psychic energy, of psychoeconomics as
opposed to
inert structure.

American psychology now has the rudiments

of a discipline equal to that of medicine.

CHAPTER

IV

PRAXIS

setting by being good
of adaption to need, is gradually enough in the matter
by the
patient as something that raises a perclived
hope that the true
self may at last be able to take the
?isks involved ?n
starting to experience living.
(Winnicott, 1956
p.

It is not without reason that most of
the major,

positive perspective developments have all proceeded
from
work with children or with the more psychotic end
of the

continuum of mental health.

Freud first developed his

notions of the striving for mastery significance of the

repetition compulsion and of play in his observation of
children.

He saw the "curative," "restorative" function of

regression, fantasy, and hallucinations in his therapy with

schizophrenics, as did Carl Jung and Wilhelm Reich,

llelanie

Klein extended object relational theory and Anna Freud

humanized technique in their work with children.

Fairbairn,

Winnicott and Guntrip solidified object relational theory
out of their experiences with the schizoid and seemingly

more psychotic phenomena.

Winnicott also was guided by his

daily contact with children and their mothers in his extensive pediatric practice.
It seems that children and those with more psychotic

symptomology are most acutely sensitive to the personal
100
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infringement and intrusiveness
of negative perspective
interventions.
They have taught these
major theorists the
most about the human condition
by their refusal to be
reduced to non-personal mechanisms.
In the unsocialized
directness and insistent, unsettling
communication

of their

symptomology, they force us to look
more deeply at ourselves
and at the consequences of the world we
have constructed.
Children and psychotics have especially
taught us
about our mistaken notion of change in the
psychotherapeutic
process.

Western industrialized man is especially fond
of
his ability to manipulate the environment.
Psychology
has

not been immune to man's hubris in his ingenious
capacity to
effect change.
But children and psychotics have been
especially resistant to allowing psychotherapists to change
them.

New techniques have had to be developed to allow

successful work with these populations in particular.

Most

of all, psychotherapists have been forced to either question

their notion of change or to declare these resistant,

symptomatic people untreatable.

Psychotics and children

have instructed those who could listen that it is unavailing
to attempt forceful manipulation.

Even more, they have

demanded that therapists give up the comforting notion that
they make changes happen.

Rather, the impetus for change is

situated within the client himself and is communicated in
the symptom's reaching out for a dialogic encounter.

All

.
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the therapist r^st do. and
this is a very difficult
"all" to
achieve, is symbolically adapt
to the client's
psychological
needs
feel that children and
psychotics have been most
instrumental in "instructing" me in
the significance and
I

practical applicability of the positive
perspective.
My
academic background had been in literature,
especially
poetry, and philosophy when I accepted
a position as a livein head of a residential house for
psychotics.
I wanted to
sound the reality of my interest in psychology
originally
sparked by the power for literary critique of
Jungian

analytic theory.

A year long immersion in daily living with

adolescent and adult psychotics, under the guidance
of Dr=
John Rosen, convinced me that these residents were
communicating.

The communication, however, was in a form more

reminiscent of highly symbolic, nondiscursive poetry than
ordinary, linear conversation.

In living together we were

all forced to reach some understanding of one another,
if only for the accomplishment of daily household tasks.

This very intense year at Twin Silos left me with the

conviction that the actions and words of psychotics had
meaning, no matter how seemingly bizarre or crazy.

I

was

especially struck by the psychotics' use of humor, of irony,
to cautiously make contact,

test my capacity to understand,

and yet still remain safely at a distance.

I

was frequently
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vexed and impatient with this
indirectness.
I wanted to
exercise a greater degree of control
and immediate effectance both for the carrying out of
daily chores and for
"making" these patients "get better."
Since they were crazy
I felt I had to be the one to
do something to make change
happen.
But whenever I became "pushy," direct
and
.

intru-

sive, no matter how good my intentions
or how important the
task, my efforts were resisted.
This

challenged my needs

for power and effectance.
I

also met with very frustrating resistance whenever

responded in literal ways to their symbolic language.

1

I

felt I had to get them to speak and act more "normally,"

like the relatively asymptomatic world.
cult to stay with symbology.

mitigate this indirectness.

I

It was too diffi-

felt it was my job to

My attempts at getting them to

talk more discursively were always resisted.
to give

.

symbolic tea

.a
.

.

I

had to learn

bit of symbolic bread and a spoonful of
."

(Sechehaye,

1951b, p. 138).

Seriousness was another major issue.

I

felt entirely

justified in trying to promote greater seriousness and more
discursive communication.

Symbology and the seemingly

unserious, play-like quality the residents demanded in our

relating was OK for fun and for poetry, but not for the
"real" world or the serious task of getting them un-crazy.

Whenever

I

waxed self-righteous as the representative of

s
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sanity and became too serious, too
directive, unwilling to
play, the residents would get angry
and give up communicating for awhile.
I am a product of the ethic
in the

western industrialized world that work is
virtuous and needs
to be separated from play (Russell.
1935/1960). Winicott
notion of therapy as a form of play (1971,
'

pp.

40.

57), and

of therapy as not doing (1958/1975, Chapter XXI), is
very

difficult to achieve.

After my year at Twin Silos,

I

concentrated on the

therapy of the more psychotic population, with somewhat less
emphasis on play therapy with children, in my graduate and

residency clinical work.

Reading, and the fortuitous super-

vision with Frank Summers, Ph.D., at our Sustaining Care
satellite of The Psychiatric Institute of Northwestern

University Medical School, allowed me to grasp the overall
historical significance of my developing orientation and to
further conceptualize and label two important concepts.

The

first is the necessity for the therapist to adapt to the

needs of the client (Winnicott)

.

The second concept is the

reality of the client's true self and its inherent striving
for object related maturation.

The locus for the impetus of

change lies not in the therapist but in the client.

The

arena for therapy is in the dialogic space between client
and therapist.
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From my experience,

I

began to more clearly see a

fundamental divide in the clinical
attitude and therapeutic
approach to clients derived from
implicit assumptions in
society, in our profession, and
internalized as needs within
ourselves.
I have come to label this
divide simply
the

positive and negative perspectives.

The positive perspec-

tive is always an achievement, both to
recognize and to
implement.
In our culture the negative
perspective always
tends to dominate and is always associated with
power and
the status quo.

The positive perspective is thus always

radical, it takes courage to achieve it, and it can only
be

sustained for short periods of time through the radical
techniques of empathy and introspection.

With this dichotomy in mind,

I

was able to see the

possibility of a unified orientation which could inform all
aspects of our existing techniques and theory.

It has been

a rewarding challenge to attempt to apply this orientation

in the field to the three clinical roles I try to "play":

therapist, supervisor, and consultant.

I

will give a brief

sketch of some of the promise and the difficulties in my
efforts to apply the positive perspective orientation.

Therapy

Therapy has been my basic research laboratory, medium,
and teacher.

It has been the setting where I have tried out
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techniques in accord with the
positive perspective, it
has afforded an endless supply
of material, and the
unceasing feedback from my clients
has been my major source
of
confirmation and criticism. Since
the preceding chapters
have been about therapy, I „iu
u^it this section to highlighting important positive
perspective consequences
for

therapy and my struggles with them.

In addition,

I

will

provide one example, drawn from the
literature, to exemplify
these themes.
The positive perspective facilitates
therapy with all

client populations:

children through the aged and the

acutely psychotic through those with the mildest
of adjustment disorders. The positive perspective is not
a new
theory but only a complement to existing theories.

I

feel

it fits best with a basically psychoanalytic,
object rela-

tional, self psychology base.
I

have grown into.

That has been the orientation

By "psychoanalytic"

I

don't mean psycho-

analysis itself but, rather, a psychoanalytic orientation in
psychotherapy.

This essentially boils down to a belief in

the determinacy of the unconscious, a recognition of the

symbolic nature of thought and behavior even if the client
isn't trying to follow the first cardinal principle of

psychoanalysis, and a setting where transf erential and

regressive phenomena are emphasized.
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The most important consequence
of the positive perspective is the altered attitude
of the therapist.
Learning
to do therapy is, most of
all, a matter of achieving
the
proper attitude. All the technique
and theory in the world
is useless unless one can adopt
a very special orientation
toward the client, the therapeutic
situation, and oneself.
The positive perspective, by
situating the motive
force for change within the client, helps
create
that

attitude needed for a successful working
alliance and helps
one correct counter-transf erential intrusions.
The client

is always trying to actively communicate
and find that

"facilitating environment" he needs.

It is only necessary

for the therapist to provide a "good enough holding
environ-

ment."

The client, after a period of testing, will work

with and use the therapist (and continue to test) to give up
false self adaptions and allow his true self to emerge.

The

positive perspective helps encourage this process by promoting greater warmth toward the client and appreciation of his

creativity--his unique way of expressing his problem and of
trying to solve it.
I

have found that

to do too much,

over- interpret

.

I

have a tendency in therapy to want

to make things happen,

to force change,

to

Winnicott's notion of working towards not

interpreting is especially useful for me to keep in mind.
over- interpret and become anxious mainly when the flow of

I
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material slows and

1

sense distancing by the
client.

The

positive perspective philosophy
helps me at the times to
supervise myself.
Rather than looking to the
client when
resistance phenomena appear, I
am nnach quicker to look to
gaps in the quality of my empathy.
Invariably my own
impatience, my need for control
and effectance, has altered
my attitude toward the client.
With internalized positive
perspective supervision, I am able to
discern when my interpretations become premature and when they
have the quality
of forcing the client to see something
about himself so he
can get better faster.
When therapy goes awry, the positive
perspective reminds me that the agent promoting
change is
the client and that my job is to get back to
the very
difficult task of looking and understanding.

My favorite negative perspective way to exercise
control and effectance is by allowing my ideas, my
knowledge,

to become my main focus.

I

may over- interpret or

I

may just pull into myself and lose contact with the client.
Some alternation between empathic merging and discursive

hypothesizing is necessary, but it's all too easy for me,
and for most therapists

I

know,

to value one's own clever-

ness above the creativity of the client.

As Winicott nicely

puts it:

My description amounts to a plea to every therapist to
allow for the patient's capacity to play, that is, to be
creative in the analytic work.
The patient's creativity
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Ws

much the therapist
^^^^^^^ how
iJ:^ '^a^'^^I'
^^^^ this
knowledge, or Refrain IrA.^^fr^'^^^
advertising what he knows.
(1971, p. 57)
am far from having achieved
the positive perspective
and, by definition, it is
always an ongoing struggle
to
catch it.
It can never just become
a part
I

of one.

never more than

It is

momentary achievement and it is
only in

doing, in the struggle, that it
can be approximated.
But
the ideas, the philosophy, can
serve as something to hold on
to in the unstructured potentiality
of therapy.
Like

anything else, reliance on this crutch
can become a disruptive defense, and sometimes it does.
But for the most part,
it serves me as a reliable supervisor
and a self-correcting
defense.
The disguise, the most visible aspect of
the symptom,

can be thought of as a form of test for the
therapist.
is

It

necessary for a client to establish a feeling of trust

for the therapist.

The symptom's disguise can be a way of

testing to see if the therapist can be trusted enough not
to
be fooled.

This theme of testing is presently being devel-

oped by Joseph Weiss (1971).

Unfortunately, he is casting

this valuable notion in ego psychology terms.

In self

psychology language, the client wants to know if the therapist can distinguish true from false self manifestations.

Will the therapist be like everyone else and fail to look
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for the vital, real self?

Does the therapist have
the

courage and enough real self to
tell one from the other?
To
not be content with compromise
adaptions at the expense of
the self?
The positive perspective cannot
be maintained for
long.
All of us need our sessions to
be well bounded in
time, say fifty minutes, and our
overall time of direct
client contact to be limited.
But even then we are often
deaf to the communication of our clients.
The quality of
our empathy waxes and wanes. We are human.
Too much chaos
and even the hardiest among us feel the need
for organization.

We will make mistakes.

It's amazing how much blind-

ness and stupidity on our part the client's self
will
tolerate.

As long as we can occasionally have the positive

perspective remind us that there is a real, communicating
person whose environment failed him we can even make use of
these failures.

Recognizing that we have failed, realizing

the importance of this, and revealing it at the proper time
is a positive perspective achievement.

One of my biggest struggles in applying the positive

perspective was, and continues to be, difficulty in being
clear about the way to express acceptance of the client's
reality.

I've talked of how I've tended to become too

active out of my need for effectance.

I've also been too

active out of my need to show acceptance of the client by

Ill

working hard "with" him.

Sometimes I've attempted to show

my acceptance of the client's inherent
creativity by being
too passive.
Establishing the proper space between
the

client and myself and finding my proper
role in the dialogue
is always difficult.
It's very hard work.
There is no
simple formula.

The positive perspective is helpful when

lose the way in telling me to look again at
the client.

I

He

has the answers.
The following is an example of an abridged dialogue in

therapy illustrative of several of these themes.

It is

drawn from Blanck & Blanck's Ego Psychology and is meant "To
illustrate how the interpretation is made from the surface
down to increasingly deeper levels

..."

(1974,

p.

320).

Blanck & Blanck capture an aspect of the positive perspective theme that Miss Keller's utterances have meaning, that

they are attempting to symbolically communicate, and espe-

cially that to properly understand the communication it is

necessary to situate it in a developmental context.

How-

ever, because of their near-sighted preoccupation with their

theory, they lose sight of their client and the negative

perspective dominates.

Blanck & Blanck purport to illus-

trate their theme by opposing their own more enlightened,
modern, earlier developmental approach to the traditional

psychoanalytic approach of interpreting at the tri-partite.
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oedipal level.

Miss Keller has been in
therapy for two
years and the therapist is a
woman.
Miss Keller:

Today I feel that I should
see a dermatologist about my skin.

Therapist:

You think constantly about
your appearance
because you are not sure that
your body is
always as it should be.

^

The therapist interprets too quickly.

She never

really finds out what Miss Keller is
trying to say.
The
therapist is distant, preoccupied with her
own preconceptions of the meaning of the material.
The therapist is
intrusive in the client's process and seems to feel
that she
must do something, must make a clever interpretation,
must
break through the client's indirectness to make changes
happen.

Further, the therapist interprets away from the

object related component of this communication and misses
the interpersonal message to the therapist.

Miss Keller:

Sometimes I think I look better than at
other times.
(Passive compliance with the
therapist)

Therapist:

You are not always certain that your body
is the same.

Miss Keller:

I did not know much about my body when
was a child.

Therapist:

Where was your curiosity?

I

Blanck & Blanck claim that "This comment is both to
encourage curiosity and also to elicit historical material"
(p.

320)

.

They also see it only in terms of providing
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genetic material:

in this
i-nis case,
ca^P

that ^-u
there was no masturbat-T.^+-

tion and therefore their
hypothesis is correct that
the
phallic stage was never adequately
attained.
The positive
perspective doesn't deny the
importance of understanding
communication in the context of a
developmental perspective,
far from it.
The problem for this therapist
is that this il
her only focus and it seems to serve
as an intellectualized
defense against becoming involved in
the broader, interpersonal communication.
The therapist is evincing a demeaning,
know-it-all attitude and continues to usurp
her power and
stay in charge.

Miss Keller:

I

Therapist:

Do you think you noticed your mother's
body changing when she was pregnant?

Miss Keller:

Well,
that.

always feel there is something wrong.
(She's not just talking about her body!)

I

must have but

I

don't remember

Blanck & Blanck say that "Repression is operative"
(p.

321).

However, the therapist blindly barrels along with

her enlightened Ego Psychology theory and is producing more

material than the client.
Therapist:

But you often worry about gaining weight.
(The therapist is relentless.
She clearly
feels she knows better than the client.)

Miss Kell QIC:

I had a dream 1st night.
I was going on
a trip abroad.
You were the tour director.
You divided us up into two groups -experienced travelers and novices. You
put all the men in the superior group.

.
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Blanck & Blanck say:

"A dream, presented following
an

intervention, confirms that the
intervention is correct in
content and timing" (p. 321).
They go on to say again that
their interpretive level is
correct in being pre-phallic and
that the patient's poor body image
is a result of feeling
damaged because of her lack of a penis
when she compared
herself to her brother. Further, "The
therapist,
here,

wants to lead to the condensation in the
primary process of
the observation of the mother's enlarged,
pregnant body with
the brother's and possibly father's penis"
(p.

321).

Rather than disputing the accuracy of these professed

aetiological links,

I

think it is more fruitful only to ob-

serve that the theoretical and meta- theoretical assumptions
of Blanck & Blanck and the therapist are obscuring their

ability to see and to listen.

Their attitude has been

affected by the physicalistic nature of their orientaHion
They are heavy-handedly applying their theory the way a

mechanic might apply grease to a wheel bearing.

The poor

client is relatively inert while they drive home one inter-

pretation after another so as to give the client the benefit
of their enlightened insights.

It is the very nature of

their theory, its implicit immanent quality that restricts

their vision and makes empathy difficult.
The last communication by Miss Keller, the dream, is
as clear a statement as one might V7ish of the method and

115

attitude of the therapist and the
effect that this has had
on her.
Whatever her genetic experiences
are that make her
feel inferior to men, they are being
reinforced, recapitulated, by the dominant and superior
attitude of
the thera-

pist.

It's amazing that Blanck & Blanck
can only see the

telling of the dream as a present, a
confirmation of their
approach.
Dreams, like any other material, may be
used by
the self to communicate any kind of meaning.
To rigidly see
the presentation of a dream as always a gift is to
have an

overly simplistic view of communication.

Ironically, the

very communication used by Blanck & Blanck to prove the
rightness of their interventions clearly indicts their
theory and its application as promoting misalliance with the
client.

The dream is only taken as a superficial sign of

something else, a present.
isn't taken seriously.

In the end, this communication

The interpersonal meaning of the

content is ignored and the form of the communication, a

retreat to dream narration the better to directly disclose
her feelings about therapy, is missed.

Supervision

Although

I

derived the elements of the positive

perspective from therapeutic experience, supervision and

consultation have required that
S3nithesize these elements.

I

clearly explicate and

My major focus in conveying the
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positive perspective orientation
in supervision is in
getting the supervisee to question
his implicit assumptions
about therapy and the notion
of change.
At times
this

becomes didactic, and then no
doubt I'm least effective.
But this seemingly abstract,
philosophical discussion about
the premises of therapy has been
surprisingly helpful to

both new and experienced therapists.
This approach has been most successful
when the

personality of the supervisee allowed me to
ground his
difficulty in achieving the positive perspective

in his

counter- transfer ential issues.

Every impediment to using

the positive perspective can always be traced to

internalized aspects of society's negative perspective.
They operate out of the supervisee's awareness and he will
always resist giving them up.

He will often experience them

as deep needs of his own.
I

have found that alternating between philosophy and

counter-transference kept supervision from becoming too much
like therapy.

The stress on theory provided the supervisee

with an articulated perspective he could take with him into
the therapy room.

Without emphasizing theory, the super-

visee comes to attribute too much power to the supervisor
and is never afforded the security of knowing how his

material will be reviewed.
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have found it important
to model the positive
perspective with the supervisee.
The same benefits the
positive perspective confers on
the therapeutic relationship
apply to the supervisory
relationship.
Of special significance is the opportunity for
the supervisee to truly let
his
real self emerge and risk failure.
To the extent that he
remains armored in false self roles
adopted to comply with
his image of a "real" therapist
he makes little progress in
learning the craft and is guaranteed
failure with
I

his

client.

Adopting the proper attitude is one of
the most

difficult of the positive perspective
achievements.

The

hovering attention, the personal warmth,
maintaining the
space required for play, all are much better
demonstrated
than described.
Or better yet, the theory coupled with the
experience provides both substance and structure
enabling

assimilation of the experience.

Another way to look at the supervisor's exemplifying
what he wishes to convey is parallel process.

ably this phenomenon is of great significance.

UnquestionToo often

I

have seen supervisors doing other than they say with their
supervisees.
apy.

The results are always destructive for ther-

Treating the supervisee as a person rather than a word

processer pays great dividends.

It is vitally important to

be sensitive to the inner reality of the supervisee, his

sensitivities and his needs.

Without this, the supervisee
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will either stay too distant
and be unable to expend
the
effort it takes to appreciate
the inner reality of his

client or else he will rebel
and get too close and
enmeshed
with the client.
The ability to merely see
resistance phenomena rather
than react to them is difficult
to learn.
And even more, to
truly believe that the client is
always right and to look to
yourself for the therapeutic failure,
your failure to
adequately adapt and understand, takes
considerable theoretic repetition and great confidence in
the support of the
supervisor.

Again,

it's important for the supervisor to

model this interaction as well.

Few supervisors can main-

tain the perspective that the supervisee is always
doing the
best he can and that the motive force for change
within

supervision must be attributed to the supervisee.

Confi-

dence in his growth if given sufficient empathic under-

standing is the sine qua non for facilitating the super-

visee's achievement of the positive perspective.
Perhaps the main obstacle to successful therapy for
the beginning therapist is his need to feel he is doing

something.

Therapeutic space creates great anxiety in

fledgling therapists.

They always seem to need to fill it.

They are impatient for change and will exhaust themselves

forcing it to happen.
struggles.

Of course, this only results in power

Clients will fight back when they sense they're

.
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being objectified, when there is
intrusion into their
personal reality.
It is important to

flush this issue out

early and to reinforce the positive
perspective view with
much repetition. Powerless neophyte therapists
will tend to
assume what power they can in session with their
clients and
are loathe to give up the power.
The positive perspective view on diagnosis and the

meaning of symptomology is of great value in helping the
therapist alter his perspective.

In traditional diagnostic

labeling the deck is stacked against seeing the continuity
of normality with madness.

The negative perspective assump-

tions easily lead to a sense of separateness from, and

superiority to, those with noticeable symptoms.

This is, of

course, out of the awareness of the supervisee and he will

vehemently object that he doesn't at all think of himself as
superior if the subject is broached in these terms.

Never-

theless, as Zilboorg (1941/1967) points out, this attitude
of superiority runs deep and has been with us for centuries

The positive perspective philosophy, when directed toward

diagnosis and symptoms, allows recognition of this fact

without directly confronting the supervisee with a challenge
to his self image.

Langs'

(1979) recent book.

The Supervisory Experience

,

contains some of the most advanced psychodynamic thinking on
supervision.

Like many of his publications, however, the
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text is taken from Langs
gs

answer format.

oral responses
r»o
oral
in a question and
Consequently the book
lacks a coherent
"s

sustained and detailed
explication of his position
His
overall orientation does
come through and the
content of his
answers illustrates many of
the
Lne do<5i>-j,.o
positive ^
y
perspective themes
and techniques for achieving
them
in supervision.

One of Langs

major techniques in helping
the supervisee gain a therapeutic way
of seeing is by stressing
theory, especially the context
of the therapeutic encounter.
"I would offer the supervisee
a rather detailed discussion
of the function of the frame:
its importance in creating a
symbolic field and therapeutic
"
regression
's

.

.

(p

•

131).

Langs also continually stresses the
significance of countertransference as evoked by the client, by
the setting of
therapy, and by the supervisory relationship.
Even more,
Langs focuses on the meaning of the
communication between
client and therapist and emphasizes the
importance to the

supervisee of understanding that "the therapist's
interventions are the immediate adaptive context for the
patient's

subsequent associations"

(p.

122).

Langs even stresses the

importance of empathy for both therapist and supervisor.
However, Langs misses an important ingredient that

I

have found most useful in effectively conveying these
themes.

In terms of empathy,

for example, Langs only refers

to it in terms of its "validating" nature

(p.

323),

a

kind
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of supervisory check on
the therapist's narration
of
therapy.
Nowhere does Langs stress
one of the most essential aspects of supervision:
the modeling of empathic

understanding with the supervisee.

Langs frequently warns

of the dangers of intellectualization
by both supervisor and
supervisee and yet his mode of relating
to the supervisees
is as distant and intellectualized
as one can imagine.

Langs does not do as he advises.

Consultation
I

have tried to find ways to implement the positive

perspective philosophy in schools and a halfway house.

I

believe in not supplying direct service to the students
and
residents of these settings.

My orientation is to work with

the teachers, parents, and counselors.

I

try to facilitate

their work, help empower them to work more cooperatively and
to utilize their own resources more effectively.

I

believe

consultation means working yourself out of a job.
My consultation technique is similar to my methods in

supervision.

In these consultation settings, my "teaching"

and my attempts to exemplify the positive perspective have

met with more success than

I

anticipated.

The teachers, parents, and counselors with whom

are psychologically naive.

I

work

The basic problem for the

consultant with this relatively untrained population is how
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can one possibly Inculcate
therapeutic skills in an
extremely limited period of time.
These skills normally take
years
of training, study and
supervision to acquire. What
difference can a consultant possibly
make in what often appears
to
be an impossible task?

have found that a consultant
can make a great deal
of difference by using the same
shortcut method utilized in
supervision.
Instead of focusing on one incident
or even
one type of situation with parents,
teachers, and counselors, it is much more efficient in
the long run to use the
presenting incident as a way to discuss the
philosophy of
I

change in a broader context with that person or
institution.
For the consultant to understand that the most
obvious form
of the presenting symptom is less important than
the
total

contextual message of the symptom is to approximate
achieve-

ment of the positive perspective.
This may at first seem like the long way around to

both consultant and consultee.

The consultant wants to

prove himself, demonstrate his cleverness, his understanding,

and his ability to make something happen.

The person

or organization seeking help is looking for the answers, and

perhaps especially looking for the consultant to provide the
service directly.

As with Freud's second cardinal rule of

psychoanalysis, maintaining abstinence, the consultant must
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abstain from directly responding
to these explicit or
implicit requests or to the
insistence of his own needs.
It is tempting to encourage
dependency in those to
whom we consult and to establish
a sinecure for ourselves
in
the process.
It is difficult to put off
the imagined, but
no less insistent, need in ourselves
and others for
answers,

control and effectance.

To the extent that I have been
able

to ward off these pressures and get
the help seekers to look
to first principles and to themselves,

the results have been

quick in forthcoming.
Perhaps this process can be analogized to the
notion
in psychotherapy of the client's internalization
of the

therapist.

In this case,

the consultees internalize not the

consultant but an orientation.

The orientation of the

positive perspective is best gleaned from being in the
presence of a consultant exemplifying this orientation and
from encouragement in looking at basic assumptions.

This

requires more explanation.

Looking at basic assumptions with teachers, parents,
and counselors is similar to doing it with supervisees.

Consultees have less initial theory than those we supervise
so the transition to pure philosophical theory requires an

extra emphasis on making this theory concrete.

However, the

problems and benefits that accrue from this basically

didactic approach are the same as in supervision.

This
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direct "teaching" of theory has been
well accepted by all
the populations to whom I consult.
But this
sort of

teaching, even when well grounded in
the consultee's experience, isn't enough.
It is necessary to couple this
with the
best teacher of all, exemplification.

When

I

say that it is necessary for a consultant
to

exemplify the positive perspective

mean several things.

I

The example must be set in the relationship itself with

parents,

teachers, and counselors.

There is a dialogue in

the consultative relationship in which the consultee is

seeking to have his self and his striving for mastery
recognized, appreciated, and engaged.

The consultant can

further exemplify the positive perspective by the material
he selects.

He needs to show that within the seemingly

negative situation both the ultimate recipient (the student
or child or resident) and the consultee are trying to

communicate and establish hopefulness.

Also,

the consultant

exemplifies by his way of talking about the material.

His

timing, his attunedness to the receptivity of the consultee,
his non-pejorative language, his lack of implying a superior

attitude, his unwillingness to join the consultee in indulging the temptation for finding power in their alliance, all

of this is essential.
The workings of exemplification are something of a

mystery.

I

have discussed modeling and parallel process in
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the supervisory process.

permission.

Another important component
is
Everyone seems to know at
heart
that the

positive perspective is desirable.

However, it is enor-

mously difficult to achieve and
to maintain.
It has the
quality of a taboo.
It must always remain
radical and
seemingly risky to acknowledge.
When
a consultant,

a

representative of "sanity" and of a
legitimized therapeutic
technique, exemplifies the positive
perspective,
the inter-

nalized societal censors are temporarily
neutralized.
negativity is transmogrified and where once

The

there was only

deficit and negativity, now there is communication,
striving, and hope.
What was obvious becomes possible,

at least

until the censors return.
One of the consultative settings in which

I

introduced

the positive perspective was a half-way house for
discharge

patients from a state mental institution.

These residents

of the half-way house were all a more chronic population and

all came from relatively financially poor families.

None of

the half-way house staff had training or experience in

mental health and all tended to come from middle to upper

middle class families.

The staff was liberal, young,

humanistically oriented, and looking for meaningful work.
They were all underpaid.

Politically, it has been expedient

and good public relations for the state bureaucracy to dump
the most difficult and S3niiptomatic population on those least
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trained to understand or care
for them.
state saves money (or thinks
it will),

It's cheap, the

and the politicians

wave the humanistic banner of
"the least restrictive environment" in front of their applauding
constituency. However,

in this case,

the very youth of the staff,
their lack

of training, their idealism and
desire to find meaning where

others avoided it, allowed them to be
receptive to an
alternative way of looking at these ex-patients
and the
system that had institutionalized them.
I

was offered a consulting job on the only basis
the

half-way house could afford:

two hours per week.

Besides

myself, there was no other training, supervision, or
clinical guidance afforded.

Given this extreme time limitation

and the magnitude of the work to be done

most effective orientation

I

I

felt that the

could take was to concentrate

almost wholly upon the staff, its attitude, clinical expertise, and ability to use their own resources.

No specific

case material will be presented as my focus in the consultation always remained on the general, systemic application of
the positive perspective.

When

I

arrived, my first impression was that these

dedicated, well intentioned, hard working counsellors were

serving as cannon fodder for the political war machine.
They were overwhelmed with their task and had no guiding
orientation.

Burnout was threatening, morale was low, and

everyone jumped from crisis to
crisis.
perspective could be put to a

If the positive

test anywhere, this was
surely
it (although the school
systems were no better)
The
.

negative perspective was here fully
reified.
The reality of
madness:
its suffering, its deep-rooted
nature, its persistence, all were denied by this
token gesture of the stat e
of Massachusetts.
No one had considered real
improvement as
a serious goal as there was no
serious funding.
I was
concerned that my role was only intended
to appease the
workers, the staff, to let them vent
their frustration, and
that any other approach was foreclosed
by design (unconscious) of the bureaucrats.

During the first several weeks of my consultation
the
staff entertained magical expectations.

They wanted me to

personally solve the unending crises and give them hard-

nosed advice and procedures so they could better manage the
crazy residents.

I

resisted the temptation to play an

expedient god and tried to work towards the long term goal
of understanding, of a radical change of attitude, and of

better use of their own resources.

I

occasionally did

intervene and become more directive when it seemed a "real"
crisis threatened, or when

I

Even in these cases, however,

was persuaded that one did.
I

found that

I

had made a

mistake and that the crisis could easily have been handled
just as well if

I

had stuck to my self-avov/ed approach.
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We met in group sessions and either
singly or as a
team they would present the problems they
were having with a
particular resident. Little by little they
began to get
away from this crisis model and started to trust
their
ability, especially as a team, to confront the
challenging

problems.

residents.

I

focused on their basic assumptions about the
These always came down to attributions made

about the most visible and superficial aspects of their
symptoms:

they were unmotivated, lazy, non-communicative,

resistant, provocative, nonsensical, non-serious, and they

stubbornly seemed to want things their own way.

It was

extremely difficult for the staff to see that there might be
a symbolic,

ology.

interpersonal meaning in the apparent symptom-

Even more, the staff implied that

I

must be soft-

headed or just plain wrong to think that the residents had a
striving for mastery and cure and that it was up to the
staff to understand the form this took and adapt to it

.

I

advocated allowing and encouraging the residents to come
together more often and to feel freer in their use of the

half-way house environment.

Out of their need for separa-

tion from madness, the staff had unconsciously communicated
to the residents that they should stay to themselves and to

their own rooms.

At heart, it seemed that the staff had an unspoken
fear of madness and loss of control.

This issue was
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m

manifested in thPiTr,.^K-: t
their mabxixty
to empower the
residents to
use .ore of the half-way
house
i

•

on their own ter.s

The

counsellors felt they were
above reproach in their
great
sacrifice of ti.e and effort
in organizing activities
for
the residents.
Letting go of some of
their organizational
control was very difficult.
But most difficult of
all was
letting go of the control they
maintained in interpersonal
encounters.
The staff always tended to
approach

the residents with their own preconceived
agendas based on their
class values and on the criteria
by which the bureaucrats
would judge them: maintaining a
job, keeping their apartments clean, managing money
appropriately, and interacting
with -normal" social skills. These
encounters always turned
into power struggles, with the
residents communicating

that

they weren't being heard in ever more
dramatic ways and with"
the staff hiding their anger behind
greater distance and

self-righteous insistence on their middle class
values.
have now been working at the half-way house
for over
two years and I feel great progress has been made.
All
I

the

"regular staff" has stayed.

There is a much greater sense

of professionalism and pride in their work.

The half-way

house, despite its clinical and bureaucratic dependence, is

enjoying an atmosphere of self-reliance.

The staff is much

more aware of the political and clinical realities and are
coming to appreciate the radical nature of their enterprise

130

and the level of their
clinical insight.
The worlc they
must do is rarely facilitated
by the rest of the
de-institutionalizing system.
More often, the nonchalance
and the demeaning attitude
(to say nothing of the
ineptness)
taken by the legions of
psychiatrists, psychologists,
social
workers and bureaucrats makes
their work even more difficult.
None of the staff can
individually maintain the
positive perspective for very long
in the face of all this
outer and inner pressure. We have
addressed this problem by
spending considerable time working
on the staff structure so
as to promote closeness and
cooperative reinforcement of

this radical perspective.

We have faced up to the task of

clarifying the implicit power structure
within the half-way
house and in this respect and in others
I have had to prove
my lack of collusion with the bureaucrats,
with the
leader-

ship of the half-way house, and with their
own defenses.

I

have most often failed with the last of these
challenges,

with the collusive pull of their defenses.
The staff is now using their own resources for
peer

supervision.

They are presenting case material with much

greater depth, with attention to the interpersonal significance of the symptomatic behavior, and with far less of a
crisis orientation.

In some respects they have moved away

from the anti-psychiatric, humanistic orientation of two
years ago.

This was exemplified by an outward show of
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disdain for structure or money,
an unwillingness to look
at
power issues, and a generally
suspicious and resentful
attitude toward clinical work.
And yet, as they have bee ome
more structured, as they have
come to take madness more
seriously, they have been enabled
to truly achieve a radical
perspective.
Given the initial cons traits of
this consultation, my
original goal of working towards
staff adoption
of the

positive perspective has proven feasible.

It's unclear to

what extent the residents have benefited
from this approach
as there were no experimental controls.
To
the extent that

the staff is more understanding of the
residents, that the

residents are interacting more and using more of
their
environment, the positive perspective has been useful.

Further confirmation is their readiness to soon let
go of
their consultant.
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